Dynamic Regulation of Quality by Auray, Stéphane et al.
Dynamic Regulation of Quality∗
Ste´phane Auray† Thomas Mariotti ‡ Fabien Moizeau§
First draft: August 2005
This draft: July 2007
Abstract
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1. Introduction
The provision of quality by public utilities or regulated firms more generally is one of the main
objectives of regulatory activity. Besides securing basic services such as electricity supply or
voice and data transmission, regulators attempt to incite regulated firms to provide adequate
levels of service enhancements that affect final customers’ welfare. For instance, the speed
and clarity of transmissions are key dimensions of quality in the telecommunications sector,
as is the reliability of supply in the energy sector.
The literature on the regulation of quality has mostly focused on static frameworks, with
special emphasis on the issue of quality verifiability (see Laffont and Tirole (1991), Lewis and
Sappington (1991, 1992), and the survey of Sappington (2005)). However, in many cases, the
management of quality can be properly understood only in a dynamic context. For instance,
the maintenance of a road or electricity network requires sustained efforts, while the network
itself is subject to exogenous events which affect the quality of the service it provides to final
customers. Similarly, the quality of water supply is affected by exogenous polluting activities,
and requires continuing cleaning up efforts. In all these examples, the quality of the good or
service provided evolves over time as a result of maintenance efforts and exogenous random
shocks, and these efforts and shocks have long-lasting effects. As a result of this, quality is a
durable characteristic which can be viewed as a capital stock: the current quality of service
depends on its past levels. This paper analyzes the problem of optimal regulation of quality
in such a dynamic environment. In this framework, we endeavor to shed light on the following
questions: What is the best incentive scheme when the regulated firm’s decisions affect the
level of quality available both in the present and in the future? Does private information
systematically lead to under-provision of quality, as in a static environment?
Our analysis focuses on the case where quality is verifiable. That is, it can be described
ex ante in a contract and certified ex post in court, and, as a result of this, the regulator can
directly impose a quality target on the regulated firm, or more generally reward or punish
the firm directly as a function of quality improvements. This is most relevant for industries
such as electricity, where the number and intensity of outages can be ascertained in an almost
costless way, or water supply, in which the chemical composition of water provides an accurate
measure of its quality for final customers.1 While quality itself is verifiable, we assume that
the factors governing its evolution over time cannot be verified separately, and are private
information of the regulated firm. Thus, in line with Lewis and Sappington (1991), the
regulator cannot determine the portion of overall quality that can be respectively attributed
to the regulated firm’s maintenance efforts and to the exogenous quality shocks. Quality
shocks are assumed to be independently distributed across periods. Hence, the only link
between periods is physical rather than informational. For simplicity, we consider a binomial
1As pointed out by De Fraja and Iozzi (2004), there have been in practice two types of regulatory responses
to the problem of securing an adequate quality service (see also Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994)). First,
the imposition of quality standards, enforced through legal sanctions. Second, the imposition of a link between
the firm’s allowed revenues and prices and the quality of the service it provides. For instance, in the UK water
industry, price cap adjustments are based on comparative performance indicators (OFWAT (2002)). Similarly,
UK energy distribution companies receive financial compensations according to various quality indicators
(OFGEM (2001)). Note that these two types of mechanisms require at least some dimensions of quality to be
verifiable by a court. Example of such contracts are discussed in Sappington (2005, Section 4.3). De Fraja and
Iozzi (2004) propose an extension of the Vogelsang and Finsinger (1979) dynamic model of price regulation
that allows for such price-quality tradeoffs. They do not address the issue of quality durability, which is the
objective of the present paper.
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model in which only high and low quality shocks can occur.
Two regulatory frameworks are considered in turn. We first analyze the dynamics of
quality in a stationary setup in which the regulator delegates the management of quality to a
sequence of firms or agents, one for each period. This allows us to disentangle the question of
quality dynamics from that of the provision of dynamic incentives, which is addressed in the
second part of the paper. Each agent is protected by limited liability and hence must receive
a non-negative utility in each state of nature (Laffont and Martimort (2002, §3.5)). That is,
no contract can be enforced whereby a truthful agent could potentially incur losses. Within
each period, the timing is as follows. After signing a contract with the regulator, which
depends on the current level of quality, the agent in charge privately learns his type, that
is, the current realization of the quality shock, and then privately chooses his maintenance
effort. Transfers are then effected according to the achieved level of quality.
Because the agents must receive a non-negative utility in each state of nature, the fact that
the quality shocks are privately observed by the agents leads to a sequence of non-degenerate
moral hazard problems. The main difference with a static framework is that the social value
of quality reflects not only the current social benefit of quality, but also its impact on the
continuation game played by the regulator and the future agents. Accordingly, maintenance
efforts and transfers will vary over time with the quality of the good or service provided. Using
standard recursive techniques (Stokey and Lucas (1989)), we characterize the social value of
quality under both symmetric and asymmetric information. A key result of our analysis
is that the marginal social value of quality is strictly higher under asymmetric information
than under symmetric information, reflecting a dynamic rent extraction effect. Indeed, the
informational rent that the regulator must leave to the current agent in case of a high quality
shock is decreasing in the current level of quality: when quality is high, the agency problem
becomes less severe. This implies that, relative to a static environment, the regulator has
an additional incentive to enhance quality, namely to reduce future informational rents. In
particular, she will take advantage of a high quality shock to demand a higher effort from
the current agent. As a result of this, there may be over-provision of quality relative to the
symmetric information environment, typically following a sequence of high quality shocks.
Sharper predictions are derived using a linear-quadratic specification of the model. It is
shown that, while private information leads to a lower average growth rate of quality, it also
increases the variance of quality. In the long run, the range of possible qualities is larger under
asymmetric information than under symmetric information, and thus both over-provision and
under-provision of quality can persist asymptotically.
We next turn to the case where the regulator delegates the management of quality to a
single agent, which raises the issue of dynamic incentives. To deliver analytical results, we
consider a two-period model. In each period, the agent privately learns the realization of the
quality shock, and then chooses his effort. In line with the basic model, we assume that the
agent must receive a non-negative utility at each date and in each state.2 We mainly focus
on the full commitment case, in which both the regulator and the agent can commit to a
long-term contract, subject to incentive compatibility and limited liability constraints. Our
main findings are as follows. First, the optimal long-term contract exhibits memory: the
level of distortions in the second period depends on the type of the agent in the first period.
With a sequence of agents, by contrast, distortions in the second period would depend on the
2One justification for this assumption is that the regulator is legally prevented from proposing contracts
contingent on the agent’s reported wealth.
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past only through the level of quality inherited from the first period. Second, the regulator
may now find it optimal to increase the agent’s effort following a low quality shock in the
first period. Indeed, doing so reduces the second period informational rent. This directly
benefits the regulator, and also makes misreporting by the agent in case of a high quality
shock less attractive from the first period perspective, thereby decreasing the cost of dynamic
incentives. Eventually, it may become optimal to induce a constant quality of service in the
first period, irrespective of the realized quality shock. Screening is then achieved using only
current transfers and continuation rents: following a high quality shock, the agent receives
a low transfer in the first period in exchange for a high continuation rent, while the reverse
is true following a low quality shock. In these circumstances, there is over-provision of first
period quality following both a high and a low quality shock. Using the linear-quadratic
specification of the model, we show that pooling over first period quality typically occurs
when the future is important relative to the present, that is, when quality depreciates slowly
and the discount factor is high. Our final result compares the model with a single agent
and full commitment to the model with a sequence of agents, specialized to the two-period
case. A natural question is whether it is better for the regulator to hire a single agent, or to
contract with a sequence of agents. The benefit of hiring a single agent is that the regulator
can directly condition his continuation rent on his first period performance, as in the standard
repeated moral hazard problem (Rogerson (1985)). The cost, by contrast, is that the agent
correctly anticipates the impact of his first period actions on his future utility, thus making
the first period incentive compatibility constraint more stringent than with a sequence of
agents. In the linear-quadratic specification of the model, we show that, for small levels of
asymmetric information, this second effect dominates when the probability of a high quality
shock is below a threshold value. It is therefore optimal for the regulator to contract with a
sequence of agents when high quality shocks are less likely to occur. These predictions are
reversed when high quality shocks are relatively frequent.
This paper is in line with works that extend the analysis of incentives in regulation to
a dynamic framework (Baron and Besanko (1984), Laffont and Tirole (1988, 1990), Lewis
and Sappington (1997)). In these papers, the source of the dynamics is that the regulated
firm’s costs are correlated across periods, so that the regulator progressively learns about
the efficiency of the firm.3 Instead of this, the intertemporal link stressed in this paper
is purely physical. This is similar to Lewis and Yildirim (2002), who study the optimal
regulation of a firm who learns to use cost-reducing innovations over time.4 They show that
a light-handed regulation may encourage innovation, by allowing the firm to earn greater
informational rents while providing greater service. Moreover, innovation may occur even in
the absence of long-term agreements, provided private information is renewed in each period.
Their model differs from ours in some important respects. First, private information in our
model takes the form of quality shocks that directly affect future consumer surplus and thus
have permanent effects, while it is embedded in their model in a transitory cost. Next, while
Lewis and Yildirim (2002) only allow for sequences of spot contracts, we analyze the opposite
case in which the regulator can commit to a long-term contract, subject to the constraint
that the agent must receive a non-negative utility at each date and in each state.5
3Similarly, Battaglini (2005) characterizes the optimal contract between a monopolist and a consumer
whose willingness to pay follows a Markov process.
4See Gaudet, Lasserre and Van Long (1995, 1996) and Ga¨rtner (2004) for related models.
5We briefly consider the case of short-term contracts in Subsection 4.5. The main insight is that the absence
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. In Section 3,
we analyze the dynamics of quality under symmetric and asymmetric information when the
regulator contracts with a sequence of short-lived agents. In Section 4, we consider the case
of a single long-lived agent. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Basic Model
Our model departs in two ways from standard regulation models such as those studied by
Baron and Myerson (1982) or Laffont and Tirole (1986). First, we consider a multi-period
environment. Second, we assume that there exists a physical state variable that dynamically
links periods to each other. This state variable is interpreted as the quality of a regulated
good or service, such as a road or electricity network.
The basic model focuses on the dynamics of quality, leaving aside the complex issues
related to the dynamic provision of incentives which are examined in Section 4. For this
purpose, we consider a benevolent regulator who delegates the management of quality to a
sequence of agents, one for each period. The per-period consumer surplus generated by a
good or service of quality q ≥ 0 is denoted S(q). The function S is bounded, continuously
differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave over R++.
Quality evolves over time as a function of the agents’ effort to maintain it and of exogenous
shocks. Specifically, if quality at date t = 0, 1, . . . is qt, then quality at date t+ 1 is
qt+1 = δqt + et + θt, (1)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is a depreciation factor, et is the maintenance effort exerted by the date t
agent, and θt is the date t quality shock. The parameter δ measures the extent to which
maintenance efforts and quality shocks have durable effects. The quality shocks {θt}∞t=0
are independently and identically distributed across periods, with support {θ, θ} such that
θ > θ ≥ 0, and we let ∆θ = θ − θ. For any date t = 0, 1, . . . , we denote by ν ∈ (0, 1) the
probability that θt = θ, and we let Eθ = E[θt] and Varθ = Var[θt].
An agent exerting a maintenance effort e incurs a disutility ψ(e) in monetary units. The
function ψ is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex over R+, and
satisfies ψ(0) = ψ0(0) = 0. It is analytically convenient to extend the function ψ to the whole
real line by setting ψ = 0 over R−. To guarantee that the regulator’s objective function is
concave, we also assume that ψ has a convex derivative over R+.
Agents are compensated for their efforts by monetary transfers. Given effort level et and
monetary transfer ut, the date t agent’s overall utility is then
Ut = ut − ψ(et). (2)
Each agent’s outside opportunity is normalized to zero. In addition, we assume that, to
accept working for the regulator, each agent must receive a non-negative utility in each state
of nature. An interpretation of this limited liability constraint on rents is that agents have
infinite risk aversion below zero wealth (Laffont and Martimort (2002, §3.5)).
As in Laffont and Tirole (1986), distortionary taxation inflicts a disutility $(1 + λ) on
consumers in order to levy $1 for the state, where λ > 0 is the shadow cost of public funds.
of commitment generates a ratchet effect: an agent experiencing a high quality shock today anticipates that,
as a result of this, quality tomorrow will be higher, which in turn leads to lower continuation rents.
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Hence, the date t net consumer surplus is S(qt)− (1+λ)ut, so that by (2), the corresponding
utilitarian social welfare is
S(qt)− (1 + λ)ut + ut − ψ(et) = S(qt)− (1 + λ)ψ(et)− λUt. (3)
The regulator is far-sighted and discounts future payoffs with a discount factor β ∈ (0, 1).
By (3), the expected discounted social welfare at date zero is thus equal to
E
" ∞X
t=0
βt[S(qt)− (1 + λ)ψ(et)− λUt]
#
. (4)
We assume throughout that quality is verifiable, so that the regulator can reward or punish
the agents directly as a function of quality improvements. By (1), this means that, at each
date, the sum of the agent’s effort and of the quality shock is verifiable. Under symmetric
information, efforts and shocks are themselves verifiable. Under asymmetric information,
however, neither efforts nor shocks are verifiable, as in Lewis and Sappington (1991), while
the shocks are privately observed by the agents.6
3. Regulating Quality with a Sequence of Agents
3.1. Regulation under Symmetric Information
As a benchmark, we consider the symmetric information situation in which not only quality
improvements, but also the extent to which these can be attributed to agents’ efforts or to
quality shocks are verifiable variables. As a result of this, regulatory contracts can be directly
made contingent on agents’ efforts. The existence of a shadow cost of public funds implies
that agents receive no rent at the optimum, that is ut = ψ(et) for all t = 0, 1, . . . . By (1)—(2)
and (4), the regulator’s problem is then to find a sequence of quality levels {qt}∞t=1, where
each qt is contingent on the history of shocks (θ0, . . . , θt−1) up to date t, that solves
V ∗(q0) = sup
(
E
" ∞X
t=0
βt[S(qt)− (1 + λ)ψ(qt+1 − δqt − θt)]
#)
,
given any initial quality level q0. This is a standard dynamic programming problem that can
be tackled by usual techniques. The symmetric information social value function V ∗ : R+ → R
is the unique bounded solution to the Bellman equation
V ∗(q) = max
©
S(q)− ν(1 + λ)ψ(e)− (1− ν)(1 + λ)ψ(e) + νβV ∗(q) + (1− ν)βV ∗(q)
ª
, (5)
where the controls (e, q, e, q) must satisfy the state transition constraints
q = δq + e+ θ, (6)
q = δq + e+ θ, (7)
and the feasibility constraints
q ≥ 0, (8)
q ≥ 0. (9)
6This modelling assumption is naturally reminiscent of Laffont and Tirole’s (1986) regulation model.
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Standard considerations (see for instance Stokey and Lucas (1989)) yield our first result.
Lemma 1. The symmetric information social value function V ∗ is bounded, continuously
differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave over R++.
An implication of ψ0(0) = 0 is that it is always optimal for the regulator to induce strictly
positive effort on the part of the current agent, no matter the current level of quality or the
current quality shock. That is, the feasibility constraints (8)—(9) are never binding. Denote
by e∗(q), q∗(q), e∗(q), q∗(q) the optimal choices in (5), which are uniquely determined. Then
the first-order conditions for (5) read as:
βV ∗0(q∗(q)) = (1 + λ)ψ0(q∗(q)− δq − θ), (10)
βV ∗0(q∗(q)) = (1 + λ)ψ0(q∗(q)− δq − θ). (11)
Since V ∗ is strictly concave and ψ strictly convex over R+, it follows from (10)—(11) that
q∗(q) > q∗(q): for a given level of quality, a high quality shock today leads to a higher
quality tomorrow than a low quality shock. Along with (6)—(7), (10)—(11) further imply
that e∗(q) < e∗(q): an agent facing a high quality shock exerts less effort than one facing
a low quality shock, and therefore receives a lower transfer. Note that, as a result of this,
−(1+λ)ψ(e∗(q))+βV ∗(q∗(q)) > −(1+λ)ψ(e∗(q))+βV ∗(q∗(q)), so that the regulator benefits
from a high quality shock.
Using again the strict concavity of V ∗ and the strict convexity of ψ over R+, it is easy to
check from (10)—(11) that the mappings q∗ and q∗ are strictly increasing, while the mappings
e∗ and e∗ are strictly decreasing. Since ψ0(0) = 0 and limq→∞ q∗(q) = limq→∞ q∗(q) =∞ by
(6)—(7), and since V ∗ is bounded, a further implication of (10)—(11) is that limq→∞ e∗(q) =
limq→∞ e∗(q) = 0. These properties reflect the fact that the agents’ maintenance efforts
become less important from the regulator’s viewpoint as quality improves. As a result of
this, limq→∞ V ∗(q) = limq→∞
S(q)
1−β .
3.2. Regulation under Asymmetric Information
We now turn to the case in which neither agents’ efforts nor quality shocks are verifiable.
An asymmetry of information then arises because, once in charge, agents become privately
informed of the current quality shock. Since they must receive a non-negative utility in each
state, eliciting this information from them is socially costly.7 The task of the regulator is to
design appropriate incentive schemes to overcome this hidden information problem and the
resulting moral hazard problem.
An incentive contract between the regulator and the date t agent specifies a transfer-
quality pair for each realization of the date t quality shock, which will be henceforth referred
to as the date t agent’s type. For a given level of quality q, a contract is thus a 4-tuple
(u, q, u, q). Incentive compatibility requires that
u− ψ(q − δq − θ) ≥ u− ψ(q − δq − θ), (12)
u− ψ(q − δq − θ) ≥ u− ψ(q − δq − θ). (13)
7In the absence of such an ex-post participation constraint, the regulator could achieve the symmetric
information outcome through appropriate ex-ante contracting (D’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1979)).
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Since the agent must receive a non-negative utility in each state, an incentive feasible contract
must also satisfy the following limited liability constraints:
u− ψ(q − δq − θ) ≥ 0, (14)
u− ψ(q − δq − θ) ≥ 0. (15)
It is easy to check that the optimal contract under symmetric information does not satisfy
the incentive constraint (12) of the high type agent. As usual with this type of models, the
incentive constraint (12) of the high type agent and the limited liability constraint (15) of the
low type agent together imply the limited liability constraint (14) of the high type agent. To
maximize the expected discounted social welfare, we shall momentarily neglect the incentive
constraint (13) of the low type agent, and later check that the solution thus obtained satisfies
this constraint.
Denote by U(q) = u − ψ(q − δq − θ) and U(q) = u − ψ(q − δq − θ) the rents left to the
agent under the contract (u, q, u, q), given current quality q. The limited liability constraint
(15) of the low type agent can be rewritten as:
U(q) ≥ 0, (16)
while the incentive constraint (12) of the high type agent can be rewritten as:
U(q) ≥ U(q) + Φ(q, q), (17)
where the function Φ is defined by
Φ(q, q) = ψ(q − δq − θ)− ψ(q − δq − θ). (18)
Intuitively, Φ(q, q) is the informational rent that must be left to the high type agent when the
low type agent improves quality from q to q. Since ψ is convex, Φ(q, ·) is increasing for any
value of q, while Φ(·, q) is decreasing for any value of q.8 Moreover, since ψ0 is convex, Φ(q, ·)
is convex for any value of q, and Φ(·, q) is convex for any value of q. These properties will
ensure that the regulator’s objective function is concave, and that the social value function
is strictly increasing and strictly concave.
Since leaving rents to the agent is socially costly, it will be optimal to let (16)—(17) be
binding. That is, one will have
Ut = Et[Φ(qt, qt+1) |θt = θ]1{θt=θ} (19)
for all t = 0, 1, . . . . By (1), (4) and (19), the regulator’s problem is then to find a sequence of
quality levels {qt}∞t=1, where each qt is contingent on the history of shocks (θ0, . . . , θt−1) up
to date t, that solves
V ∗∗(q0) = sup
(
E
" ∞X
t=0
βt
∙
S(qt)− (1 + λ)ψ(qt+1 − δqt − θt)−
λν
1− ν Φ(qt, qt+1)1{θt=θ}
¸#)
,
given any initial quality level q0. In analogy with (5), the asymmetric information social
value function V ∗∗ : R+ → R is the unique bounded solution to the Bellman equation
8However, for q < δq + θ, these functions are constant and equal to zero.
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V ∗∗(q) = max
©
S(q)− ν(1 + λ)ψ(e)− (1− ν)(1 + λ)ψ(e)− λνΦ(q, q)
(20)
+ νβV ∗∗(q) + (1− ν)βV ∗∗(q)
ª
,
subject to constraints (6)—(9). The following result parallels Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. The asymmetric information social value function V ∗∗ is bounded, continuously
differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave over R++.
As in the symmetric information benchmark, the condition ψ0(0) = 0 implies that the
feasibility constraints (8)—(9) are never binding: it is always optimal for the regulator to
induce strictly positive effort on the part of the current agent, no matter his type or the
current level of quality. Denote by e∗∗(q), q∗∗(q), e∗∗(q), q∗∗(q) the optimal choices in (20),
which are uniquely determined. Then the first-order conditions for (20) read as:
βV ∗∗0(q∗∗(q)) = (1 + λ)ψ0(q∗∗(q)− δq − θ), (21)
βV ∗∗0(q∗∗(q)) = (1 + λ)ψ0(q∗∗(q)− δq − θ) + λν
1− ν Φ2(q, q
∗∗(q)). (22)
Since V ∗∗ is strictly concave and ψ strictly convex over R+, and since Φ(q, ·) is convex,
it follows from (21)—(22) that q∗∗(q) > q∗∗(q). This in turn implies that the neglected
constraint (13) is satisfied by our candidate solution. Indeed, because (16)—(17) are binding,
(13) is equivalent to Φ(q, q∗∗(q)) ≥ Φ(q, q∗∗(q)), which holds as Φ(q, ·) is increasing. Because
of the second term on the right-hand side of (22), which corresponds to the distortion due
to asymmetric information, the comparison between the effort levels e∗∗(q) and e∗∗(q) is
ambiguous, unlike in the symmetric information benchmark.
Using again the strict concavity of V ∗∗ and the strict convexity of ψ over R+, together
with the convexity of ψ0 and the definition (18) of Φ, it is easy to check from (21)—(22) that
the mappings q∗∗ and q∗∗ are strictly increasing, while the mappings e∗∗ and e∗∗ are strictly
decreasing. The strict convexity of ψ over R+, along with the monotonicity of e∗∗, also implies
that the informational rent of a high type agent,
Φ(q, q∗∗(q)) = ψ(e∗∗(q))− ψ(e∗∗(q)−∆θ), (23)
is a strictly decreasing function of quality q. It follows from (21)—(22) that, as in the symmetric
information benchmark, limq→∞ e∗∗(q) = limq→∞ e∗∗(q) = 0. By (23), this implies that the
informational rent of the high type agent vanishes as quality gets large, limq→∞Φ(q, q∗∗(q)) =
0. The intuition for this result is that when quality improves, it becomes less important for
the regulator to incite the low type agent to exert effort. In particular, limq→∞ V ∗∗(q) =
limq→∞
S(q)
1−β as in the symmetric information benchmark.
Remark. Using the Envelope Theorem for (5) and (20), it is easy to check that both V ∗0 and
V ∗∗0 are strictly greater than S0. It follows that, in both regulatory contexts, the regulator
induces a higher quality than in the corresponding one-period version of the model.9 This
reflects that, because quality is durable in our model, the benefits of producing a higher
quality today arise directly through an increase of future consumer surpluses, and, indirectly,
through a reduced cost of supplying quality in the future.
9This result is in line with Lewis and Yildirim (2002, Proposition 3(i)).
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3.3. Comparing the Two Regulatory Environments
A key insight of our analysis is that the social value of quality depends on the regulatory
environment. We argue in this section that, as a result of this, asymmetric information
typically leads to distortions in both types of agents’ maintenance efforts relative to their
symmetric information levels. To establish this point, we first present some general analytical
results, and then examine a linear-quadratic specification of the model.
3.3.1. General Results
To contrast the outcomes of the regulation game under symmetric and under asymmetric
information, it is helpful to compare the social value functions V ∗ and V ∗∗. Formally, the
only difference between the Bellman equations (5) and (20) that implicitly define V ∗ and
V ∗∗ lies in the informational rent λνΦ(q, q) that appears on the right-hand side of (20). As
observed above, this rent is a decreasing function of the current quality level q. This suggests
that under asymmetric information, an additional incentive to increase quality is to reduce
future informational rents. Accordingly, the marginal social value of quality is strictly higher
under asymmetric information than under symmetric information, as shown by the following
result.
Proposition 1. For any q > 0, V ∗∗0(q) > V ∗0(q).
Along with (10) and (21), Proposition 1 implies that q∗∗(q) > q∗(q) for any q > 0. That
is, for a given level of quality q > 0, and conditional on a high quality shock occurring,
the regulator induces more effort from the agent under asymmetric information than under
symmetric information, e∗∗(q) > e∗(q). The intuition is straightforward: given a high quality
shock, the marginal cost of effort is the same in both regulatory environments, while by
Proposition 1, the marginal benefit of effort is higher under asymmetric information. In
line with the dynamic rent extraction effect outlined above, the regulator therefore takes
advantage of facing a high type agent today to build better quality for tomorrow. It should
be noted that this over-provision of quality contrasts with the prediction of a one-period
model, in which high type agents optimally exert the same level of effort under symmetric
information as under asymmetric information. Because of the additional distortion term on
the right-hand side of (22), it is not possible in general to rank the quality levels q∗(q) and
q∗∗(q) conditional on a low shock to quality. The intuition is that asymmetric information
raises both the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of exerting effort given a low quality
shock. A robust prediction of our model is however that if sufficiently many high quality
shocks occur, asymmetric information will lead to over-provision of quality relative to the
symmetric information benchmark.
The differences between the two regulatory environments do not disappear in the long
run, as can be shown by studying the asymptotic distribution of quality. Specifically, let P ∗
and P ∗∗ be the probability transition functions over quality levels respectively induced by
(10)—(11) and (21)—(22). That is, for each i ∈ {∗, ∗∗} and for any q ≥ 0, P i(q, ·) is the law
of a random variable that takes the value qi(q) with probability ν, and the value qi(q) with
probability 1− ν. Then the following holds.
Proposition 2. P ∗ and P ∗∗ have unique invariant probability measures μ∗ and μ∗∗ with
compact supports suppμ∗ and suppμ∗∗ such that max suppμ∗∗ > max suppμ∗.
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For any initial quality level q0, the distribution of quality will converge weakly to μ∗ or
μ∗∗ depending on the regulatory environment. Since the upper bound of the support of the
asymptotic distribution of quality is strictly larger under asymmetric information than under
symmetric information, one will in the long run observe high quality levels in the former case
that cannot be achieved in the latter case. Therefore over-provision of quality can persist in
the long run under asymmetric information.
3.3.2. The Linear-Quadratic Case
To obtain sharper predictions, we consider a special case of our model, in which the underlying
surplus and cost functions are quadratic,
S(q) = aq − b
2
q2, (24)
ψ(e) =
c
2
max{e, 0}2, (25)
for some strictly positive parameters a, b and c. It should be noted that the surplus function
S defined by (24) makes sense only as long as q < ab . Along standard lines (Stokey and Lucas
(1989, §4.4)), we first solve the Bellman equations (5) and (20) without taking into account
this restriction. We then check under which conditions and over which ranges the resulting
analytical solutions are economically meaningful. The appropriate parameter restrictions
amount to make θ and ∆θ close enough to zero, see the Appendix for a precise statement.
The linear-quadratic specification (24)—(25) ensures that the social value functions V ∗
and V ∗∗ are themselves quadratic over the relevant ranges, that is, for each i ∈ {∗, ∗∗},
V i(q) = Aiq − B
i
2
q2 + Ci, (26)
for some strictly positive parameters Ai, Bi and Ci, while the optimal policy functions q∗,
q∗, q∗∗ and q∗∗ are linear over the relevant ranges,
q∗(q) =
βA∗ + c(1 + λ)(θ + δq)
βB∗ + c(1 + λ)
, (27)
q∗(q) =
βA∗ + c(1 + λ)(θ + δq)
βB∗ + c(1 + λ)
, (28)
q∗∗(q) =
βA∗∗ + c(1 + λ)(θ + δq)
βB∗∗ + c(1 + λ)
, (29)
q∗∗(q) =
βA∗∗ − λν1−ν c∆θ + c(1 + λ)(θ + δq)
βB∗∗ + c(1 + λ)
. (30)
To determine the optimal policy functions, what matters are the values of A∗, B∗, A∗∗ and
B∗∗. These are easily obtained by inserting the policy functions (27)—(28) and (29)—(30) into
the Bellman equations (5) and (20) and then using (26) to identify terms. An immediate
result is that the coefficients B∗ and B∗∗ coincide, B∗ = B∗∗ = B. This reflects the property
that, in the linear-quadratic specification, and over the relevant range, the informational rent
10
Φ(q, q) is a linear function of (q, q),
Φ(q, q) = c∆θ
µ
q − δq − θ + θ
2
¶
. (31)
It should be noted that, since the marginal social value of quality is higher under asymmetric
information than under symmetric information, A∗∗ > A∗.
An immediate implication of (27)—(30) is that asymmetric information increases the wedge
between qualities following a high and a low quality shock, q∗∗(q) − q∗∗(q) > q∗(q) − q∗(q).
Our next result strengthens this insight.
Proposition 3. In the linear-quadratic case, over the relevant range, the quality spread is
larger under asymmetric information than under symmetric information,
q∗∗(q) > q∗(q) > q∗(q) > q∗∗(q). (32)
The intuition for this result can be grasped by comparing the objective functions of the
regulator in (5) and (20). Under symmetric information, the marginal value of date t + 1
quality is the same following a high or a low quality shock, namely β(A∗ − Bqt+1). By
contrast, under asymmetric information, the need to concede an informational rent to high
type agents introduces a wedge between the marginal value of quality following a high quality
shock, β(A∗∗ − Bqt+1), and the marginal value of quality following a low quality shock, net
of the incentive cost, β(A∗∗ −Bqt+1)− λν1−ν c∆θ. It turns out that
βA∗ < βA∗∗ < βA∗ +
λν
1− ν c∆θ,
so that the higher marginal social benefit of quality due to asymmetric information does not
fully offset the incentive cost given a low quality shock. As shown by (32), this simultaneously
leads to over-provision of quality following a high quality shock, q∗∗(q) > q∗(q), and to under-
provision of quality following a low quality shock, q∗(q) > q∗∗(q). While the first effect reflects
a dynamic rent extraction motive, as discussed in Subsection 3.3.1, the second effect reflects
a static rent extraction motive: the regulator induces less maintenance effort from a low
type agent in order to reduce the rent she would have to leave today to a high type agent.
Proposition 3 shows that this static rent extraction effect dominates the dynamic effect. As
can be checked from (29)—(30), this may cause a high type agent to exert more effort than
a low type agent given the same current level of quality, thus reversing the prediction of the
symmetric information benchmark.
In light of these results, it is natural to investigate which of the static and the dynamic
rent extraction motives dominates from an ex-ante perspective. To this end, we examine the
time-series properties of quality under the two regulatory regimes. Denote by {q∗t }∞t=0 and
{q∗∗t }∞t=0 the stochastic processes of quality under symmetric and asymmetric information
respectively. Provided initial quality is low, these processes will remain in the appropriate
ranges over which our analytical solutions to (5) and (20) are economically meaningful. One
has the following result.
Proposition 4. In the linear-quadratic case, quality grows at a lower expected rate under
asymmetric information than under symmetric information,
E [q∗t+1 |q∗t = q] > E [q∗∗t+1 |q∗∗t = q], (33)
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while the variance of quality growth is higher under asymmetric information than under
symmetric information,
Var [q∗∗t+1 |q∗∗t = q] > Var [q∗t+1 |q∗t = q]. (34)
From an ex-ante perspective, the static rent extraction motive therefore dominates the
dynamic rent extraction motive, and asymmetric information leads to on average lower and
more volatile quality growth. These properties carry over to the long run. For each i ∈ {∗, ∗∗},
let Eμi =
R
q dμi(q) and Varμi =
R
(q−Eμi)2 dμi(q) be the expectation and variance of quality
under the invariant measure μi. Weak convergence of the distribution of quality to μi ensures
that limt→∞ E [qit] = Eμi and limt→∞Var [q
i
t] = Varμi , no matter the initial quality level q0.
The following result provides the long run analogues of (33)—(34).
Proposition 5. In the linear-quadratic case, in the long run, quality is on average lower
under asymmetric information than under symmetric information,
Eμ∗ > Eμ∗∗ , (35)
while its variance is higher under asymmetric information than under symmetric information,
Varμ∗∗ > Varμ∗ . (36)
4. Regulating Quality with a Single Agent
We have assumed so far that the regulator can contract with a sequence of agents. We
now investigate what happens when there is a single agent the regulator can contract with
over time. In contrast with the multiple agent case, the regulator can now provide dynamic
incentives to exert effort. However, the fact that the agent anticipates the impact of his
actions on future quality and therefore on the continuation of the contract induces a further
cost for the regulator. To analyze this trade-off, we first characterize the optimal contract
with a single agent. We then compare regulation with a single and with multiple agents.
4.1. The Model
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the contractual relationship lasts only two periods:
the agent exerts effort at dates 0 and 1 to provide quality at dates 1 and 2. The model
remains otherwise the same as in Section 3, except that we no longer require the discount
factor β to be smaller than one.10 Our setup therefore differs in two ways from the dynamic
regulation models previously studied in the literature (Baron and Besanko (1984), Freixas,
Guesnerie and Tirole (1985), Laffont and Tirole (1988, 1990), Lewis and Sappington (1997)).
First, the only link between periods is physical and not informational, as quality shocks are
independently distributed across periods. This implies that the correlation between qualities
across different periods is endogenous, and depends on past quality shocks and maintenance
efforts, as well as on past contracts. Second, as in the basic model, the agent is protected
by limited liability, so that only contracts that leave him with a non-negative utility at each
date and in each state can be enforced.11
10A large discount factor may reflect the fact that the accounting period for future production stages exceeds
that for the current production stage, or that later projects are operated on a larger scale than early projects.
11Laffont and Martimort (2002, §8.1.3) study how this limited liability constraint affects the outcome of a
repeated agency model in which the link between periods is purely informational.
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4.2. Regulation under Symmetric Information
The symmetric information benchmark does not differ significantly from that derived in
Subsection 3.1, except for the finite horizon. In each period, the agent receives no rent at
the optimum, that is ut = ψ(et) for each t = 0, 1. For each realization (θ0, θ1) of the agent’s
types at dates 0 and 1, we denote by q∗1(θ0), q
∗
2(θ0, θ1) the optimal contingent quality levels
at dates 1 and 2, and by e∗0(θ0) and e
∗
1(θ0, θ1) the corresponding optimal contingent effort
levels at dates 0 and 1. Then, using the Envelope Theorem, the first-order conditions for the
regulator’s problem can be compactly written as follows:
βS0(q∗2(θ0, θ1)) = (1 + λ)ψ
0(e∗1(θ0, θ1)), (37)
βS0(q∗1(θ0)) + βδ(1 + λ)E
£
ψ0(e∗1(θ0, θ1)) |θ0
¤
= (1 + λ)ψ0(e∗0(θ0)), (38)
where q∗1(θ0) = δq0+ e
∗
0(θ0) + θ0 and q
∗
2(θ0, θ1) = δq
∗
1(θ0) + e
∗
1(θ0, θ1) + θ1 for each realization
(θ0, θ1) of the agent’s types at dates 0 and 1. The date 1 first-order condition (37) is self-
explanatory. The second term on the left-hand side of the date 0 first-order condition (38)
reflects the dynamic benefit of date 0 maintenance efforts, which is to reduce the cost of
enhancing quality at date 1.
4.3. Regulation under Asymmetric Information: Full Commitment
We now turn to the case where neither the agent’s efforts nor the quality shocks are verifiable,
but long-term regulatory contracts can be perfectly enforced, subject to the constraint that
the agent receives a non-negative utility at each date and in each state. Because of full
commitment, the Revelation Principle applies. For each pair of reports (θˆ0, θˆ1) ∈ {θ, θ}2 by
the agent, a long-term contract specifies contingent transfer levels at dates 0 and 1, u˜0(θˆ0)
and u˜1(θˆ0, θˆ1), and contingent quality levels at dates 1 and 2, q˜1(θˆ0) and q˜2(θˆ0, θˆ1).12
4.3.1. Preliminaries
We solve for the optimal contract in two steps. Consider first the date 1 contract. Since the
regulator and the agent are risk-neutral and discount future utility at the same rate, there is
no loss of generality in assuming that, whenever θ1 = θ, the agent receives no rent at date 1
no matter his date 0 report θˆ0,
u˜1(θˆ0, θ) = ψ(q˜2(θˆ0, θ)− δq˜1(θˆ0)− θ)
for each θˆ0 ∈ {θ, θ}. Standard considerations then imply that, given a date 0 report θˆ0, the
rent that the agent receives at date 1 whenever θ1 = θ must be given by Φ(q˜1(θˆ0), q˜2(θˆ0, θ)).
In turn, incentive compatibility at date 0 requires that
u˜0(θ)− ψ(q˜1(θ)− δq0 − θ) + νβΦ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ))
(39)
≥ u˜0(θ)− ψ(q˜1(θ)− δq0 − θ) + νβΦ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ)),
12We hereby restrict the analysis to deterministic mechanisms. Since the objective function of the regulator
is not necessarily concave, she may increase social welfare by using stochastic mechanisms (see Laffont and
Martimort (2002, §2.13)). Such mechanisms are however difficult to implement in practice, which is why we
chose to rule them out. This problem does not arise in the linear-quadratic specification, because the function
Φ is then linear over the relevant range, see (31).
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u˜0(θ)− ψ(q˜1(θ)− δq0 − θ) + νβΦ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ))
(40)
≥ u˜0(θ)− ψ(q˜1(θ)− δq0 − θ) + νβΦ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ)).
Since the agent must receive a non-negative utility at each date and in each state, an incentive
feasible contract must also satisfy the following date 0 limited liability constraints:
u˜0(θ)− ψ(q˜1(θ)− δq0 − θ) ≥ 0, (41)
u˜0(θ)− ψ(q˜1(θ)− δq0 − θ) ≥ 0. (42)
Denote by (u••0 , q••0 , u••1 , q••1 ) the optimal long-term contract, and define the equilibrium levels
of effort as:
e••0 (θ0) = q
••
1 (θ0)− δq0 − θ0, (43)
e••1 (θ0, θ1) = q
••
2 (θ0, θ1)− δq••1 (θ0)− θ1 (44)
for each (θ0, θ1) ∈ {θ, θ}2.
It is not a priori clear which of the constraints (39)—(40) and (41)—(42) are binding at the
optimum. This is because we require the optimal contract to satisfy not only intertemporal
participation constraints, but also the more restrictive constraints (41)—(42) on date 0 utilities.
As a result of this, one cannot for instance argue that the incentive constraint of the high type
agent and the limited liability constraint of the low type agent together imply the limited
liability constraint of the high type agent, in analogy with a standard model. Still, the
following result holds.
Proposition 6. In the optimal long-term contract, q••1 (θ) ≥ q••1 (θ), and constraints (39) and
(42) are binding. Therefore, the date 0 rent of a high type agent is given by
U••0 (θ) = Φ(q0, q
••
1 (θ)) + νβ
£
Φ(q••1 (θ), q
••
2 (θ, θ))− Φ(q••1 (θ), q••2 (θ, θ))
¤
. (45)
Equation (45) has a natural interpretation: the first term on the right-hand side is a
standard static informational rent, while the second term represents the expected discounted
gain in terms of date 1 rents from pretending to be a low type agent rather than a high type
agent at date 0.
The intuition for Proposition 6 is as follows. Suppose it were optimal to leave a low type
agent a strictly positive rent at date 0. One can verify that, in analogy with (45), this rent
must then be given by
−Φ(q0, q••1 (θ)) + νβ
£
Φ(q••1 (θ), q
••
2 (θ, θ))− Φ(q••1 (θ), q••2 (θ, θ))
¤
. (46)
The incentive for a low type agent to misrepresent his type at date 0 only comes from the
bracketed term in (46), which represents the date 1 rent differential. Since the function Φ is
decreasing in its first argument and q••1 (θ) ≥ q••1 (θ), this term can be strictly positive only if
q••2 (θ, θ) is significantly larger than q••2 (θ, θ). Given (46), the total expected discounted rents
at date 0 amount to
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(1− ν)
©
−Φ(q0, q••1 (θ)) + νβ
£
Φ(q••1 (θ), q
••
2 (θ, θ))− Φ(q••1 (θ), q••2 (θ, θ))
¤ª
+ ν2βΦ(q••1 (θ), q
••
2 (θ, θ)) + ν(1− ν)βΦ(q••1 (θ), q••2 (θ, θ)) (47)
= − (1− ν)Φ(q0, q••1 (θ)) + νβΦ(q••1 (θ), q••2 (θ, θ)).
Since (47) is independent of q••2 (θ, θ) and (42) is assumed slack, the optimal determination
of q••2 (θ, θ) involves no rent-efficiency trade-off. By contrast, since (47) is strictly increasing
in q••2 (θ, θ), it is optimal to distort q••2 (θ, θ) downward. This in turn amplifies the reduction
of date 1 rent due to the fact that q••1 (θ) ≥ q••1 (θ). As is easy to check, this implies that the
bracketed term in (46) is strictly negative, reflecting that a low type agent has no incentive
to misrepresent his type at date 0. As a result of this, he cannot earn a strictly positive rent
at date 0, contrary to the assumption.
Proposition 6 allows us to simplify the regulator’s problem as follows. Given (45), the
total expected discounted rents at date 0 amount to
ν
©
Φ(q0, q••1 (θ)) + νβ
£
Φ(q••1 (θ), q
••
2 (θ, θ))− Φ(q••1 (θ), q••2 (θ, θ))
¤ª
+ ν2βΦ(q••1 (θ), q
••
2 (θ, θ)) + ν(1− ν)βΦ(q••1 (θ), q••2 (θ, θ)) (48)
= νΦ(q0, q••1 (θ)) + νβΦ(q
••
1 (θ), q
••
2 (θ, θ)).
Using the fact that (39) and (42) are binding at the optimum, it is easy to see that (40) is
equivalent to the following monotonicity constraint:
q˜1(θ) ≥ q˜1(θ), (49)
while, given (45), (41) can be rewritten as:
Φ(q0, q˜1(θ)) + νβ
£
Φ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ))− Φ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ))
¤
≥ 0. (50)
It thus follows from (48) that, for a given value of q0, the pair of functions (q
••
1 , q
••
2 ) solves
max
(q˜1,q˜2)
{E [−(1 + λ)ψ(q˜1(θ0)− δq0 − θ0) + βS(q˜1(θ0))
− (1 + λ)βψ(q˜2(θ0, θ1)− δq˜1(θ0)− θ1) + β2S(q˜2(θ0, θ1))] (51)
− λνΦ(q0, q˜1(θ))− λνβΦ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ))},
subject to (49)—(50). While constraints (39) and (42) are necessarily binding in the optimal
long-term contract, one cannot decide a priori on the status of constraints (49)—(50). Indeed,
pooling over date 1 quality may occur, so that (40) or equivalently (49) may be binding.
Furthermore, it is unclear that a high type agent receives a strictly positive rent at date 0,
and thus that (41) or equivalently (50) are slack. We say that we are in the regular case when
the parameter values are such that this latter property holds.
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4.3.2. Date 2 Quality Levels
In this subsection, we investigate date 2 quality levels. Let us first assume for simplicity
that the regular case obtains, so that constraint (50) can be neglected. It then follows that
there is no term of the form Φ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ)) in the program (49)—(51) that determines q••2 .
This reflects that, while increasing the date 1 rent Φ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ)) by ε > 0 has a direct
expected discounted cost λν2βε for the regulator, it also allows her to reduce the expected
cost λνU••0 (θ) of the date 0 rent by exactly the same amount, see (45). Thus the cost of
providing incentives at date 1 given that the agent had a high type at date 0 is already taken
into account in the rent left by the regulator to this agent at date 0, and is therefore perfectly
internalized by her. By contrast, increasing the date 1 rent Φ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ)) by ε > 0 has a
direct expected discounted cost λν(1 − ν)βε at date 1, to which must be added an indirect
expected cost λν2βε at date 0 due to the increase of the date 0 rent U••0 (θ), see again (45).
This reflects that raising Φ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ)) makes a deviation more attractive for a high type
agent at date 0. Given these observations, it is straightforward to characterize the optimal
quality levels at date 2. One has
βS0(q••2 (θ, θ)) = (1 + λ)ψ
0(q••2 (θ, θ)− δq••1 (θ)− θ), (52)
βS0(q••2 (θ, θ)) = (1 + λ)ψ
0(q••2 (θ, θ)− δq••1 (θ)− θ), (53)
βS0(q••2 (θ, θ)) = (1 + λ)ψ
0(q••2 (θ, θ)− δq••1 (θ)− θ), (54)
so that there are no distortions of date 2 quality given the date 1 quality levels if θ0 = θ or
θ1 = θ, while the date 2 quality if (θ0, θ1) = (θ, θ) is distorted downward according to
βS0(q••2 (θ, θ)) = (1 + λ)ψ
0(q••2 (θ, θ)− δq••1 (θ)− θ) +
λν
(1− ν)2 Φ2(q
••
1 (θ), q
••
2 (θ, θ)). (55)
Note from (49)—(51) that (52)—(53) hold even if we are not in the regular case. Concerning
q••2 (θ, θ) and q••2 (θ, θ), the following general result holds.
Proposition 7. In the optimal long-term contract, the level of distortions at date 1 is strictly
higher following θ0 = θ than following θ0 = θ. In particular, q••2 (θ, θ) > q••2 (θ, θ).
In analogy with the standard repeated moral hazard problem (Rogerson (1985)), the
optimal long-term contract therefore exhibits memory, in the sense that the level of distortions
at date 1 depends on the type of the agent at date 0. This is because we impose that the
agent must receive a non-negative utility at each date and in each state. Thus, although the
date 1 contract is signed at date 0 under symmetric information about the date 1 quality
shock, the regulator cannot fully extract the agent’s expected date 1 rent at date 0, unlike for
instance in the Baron and Besanko (1984) regulation model with independent types. There
are therefore two reasons for why q••2 (θ, θ) > q••2 (θ, θ) at the optimum. First, the physical
link between periods and the fact that q••1 (θ) ≥ q••1 (θ) together imply that it is less costly to
enhance date 2 quality in state (θ, θ) than in state (θ, θ). Second, to this direct effect must
be added the shadow cost of incentives, which by Proposition 7 is strictly higher following
θ0 = θ than following θ0 = θ.
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4.3.3. Date 1 Quality Levels and Pooling
Having determined the optimal date 2 quality levels, one can move backward to date 1.
Without specifying further the model, however, it is not easy to characterize the date 1
properties of the optimal contract, and in particular to assess under which circumstances
(49) and (50) are binding. In this section, we focus on the monotonicity constraint (49), and
we determine under which circumstances pooling over date 1 quality may occur.
The reason for why this may arise at the optimum is that increasing date 1 quality
following θ0 = θ does not only affect consumer surplus, but also the informational rents that
must be left to the agent. As shown by (48), these rents consist of two terms. The first term is
proportional to Φ(q0, q••1 (θ)), which is increasing in q••1 (θ). This reflects a standard static rent
extraction motive. By contrast, the second term is proportional to Φ(q••1 (θ), q••2 (θ, θ)), which
is decreasing in q••1 (θ). As in the multiple agent model of Section 3, this reflects a dynamic
rent extraction motive. The logic is slightly different, however. In the multiple agent model,
the regulator typically wanted to increase the quality produced by a high type agent at date
0 only in order to decrease the rents that she had to concede at date 1, regardless of date 0
incentives. By contrast, in the single agent model, the regulator may want to increase the
quality produced by a low type agent at date 0 in order to reduce the date 1 rents following
a report θˆ0 = θ, and thus make a deviation less attractive for a high type agent at date
0. The fact that, as discussed in Subsection 4.3.2, date 1 rents are treated asymmetrically
by the regulator, depending on the type of the agent at date 0, explains why this dynamic
rent extraction effect now affects the quality produced by a low type agent at date 0, and
not directly that produced by a high type agent. As we will now see, this can lead to over-
provision of date 1 quality by a low type agent at date 0, and eventually to pooling over date
1 quality.
Overall, such pooling will take place if the dynamic rent extraction motive prevails, a
situation that can intuitively arise only if the discount factor β and the depreciation factor δ
are high enough. This is confirmed by our next result.
Proposition 8. If q0 is close enough to zero, pooling over date 1 quality can occur in the
optimal long-term contract only if βδ > 1.
In order to show that pooling over date 1 quality can indeed occur at the equilibrium in
the circumstances delineated in Proposition 8, we turn to the linear-quadratic specification
(24)—(25). As in the basic model, special care must be taken in specifying parameters for the
model such that the solution is economically meaningful. In particular, it turns out that for
date 1 quality levels to remain smaller than ab , the discount factor β cannot be too large for
a given value of δ. Specifically, it can be shown that if q0, θ and ∆θ are close enough to zero,
it must be the case that β < β(δ), where β(δ) is the positive solution to
β2δ(1− δ)b
βb+ c(1 + λ)
= 1. (56)
Note that β(δ) goes to infinity when δ goes to one, and thus one can choose βδ to be greater
than one as required by Proposition 8. One then has the following result.13
13This result hinges on the assumption that δ is close to one. One can show that, in the linear-quadratic
specification of the model, pooling actually requires such a high degree of quality durability. Specifically, if δ
is close enough to zero, then no pooling over date 1 qualities can occur in the optimal contract, even if β is
equal to its maximum admissible level β(δ). We refer to the Appendix for details.
17
Proposition 9. In the linear-quadratic case, for any δ close enough to one, there exists a
β(δ) ∈ (0,β(δ)) such that, for any β ∈ [β(δ),β(δ)), and for any q0, θ and ∆θ close enough to
zero, pooling over date 1 quality occurs in the optimal long-term contract and (50) is slack.
Pooling over date 1 quality distorts the allocation of resources relative to the symmetric
information benchmark. Consider the case of a high quality shock at date 0, and suppose
that we are in the regular case, as in Proposition 9. We know from (52) and (54) that, in
this case, there will be no distortions of date 2 quality levels given the date 1 quality level
q••1 (θ). In turn, q••1 (θ) satisfies the first-order condition
βS0(q••1 (θ)) + βδ(1 + λ)E
£
ψ0(e••1 (θ, θ1))
¤
= (1 + λ)ψ0(e••0 (θ))−
ξ1
ν
, (57)
where ξ1 is the multiplier associated to (49). It follows from (38) and (57) that a high type
agent at date 0 always produces at least as much quality as in the symmetric information
benchmark, q••1 (θ) ≥ q∗1(θ), and strictly more if ξ1 > 0. Thus pooling over date 1 quality
leads to over-provision of date 1 quality when θ0 = θ relative to the symmetric information
benchmark. This is naturally a fortiori true when θ0 = θ, since q∗1(θ) > q
∗
1(θ). Therefore, by
continuity, we obtain that there may be over-provision of date 1 quality when θ0 = θ relative
to the symmetric information benchmark, even if no pooling over date 1 quality actually
takes place.
Finally, it should be emphasized that pooling over date 1 quality does not prevent the
regulator from screening the agent’s type at date 0. Rather, screening is achieved through
date 0 transfers u••0 (θˆ0) and date 1 continuation rents Φ(q••1 (θˆ0), q••2 (θˆ0, θ)). Specifically, let
qp1 = q
••
1 (θ) = q
••
1 (θ). Then, one has
u••0 (θ) = ψ(q
p
1 − δq0 − θ) +Φ(q0, q
p
1) + νβ
£
Φ(qp1, q
••
2 (θ, θ))− Φ(q
p
1, q
••
2 (θ, θ))
¤
= u••0 (θ) + νβ
£
Φ(qp1, q
••
2 (θ, θ))−Φ(q
p
1, q
••
2 (θ, θ))
¤
< u••0 (θ),
where we have used the fact that (39) and (42) are binding, and that q••2 (θ, θ) > q••2 (θ, θ) by
Proposition 7. At date 0, a high type agent therefore receives a lower transfer than a low type
agent, u••0 (θ) < u••0 (θ), in exchange for a higher date 1 continuation rent, Φ(q
p
1, q
••
2 (θ, θ)) >
Φ(qp1, q
••
2 (θ, θ)). Note that q
••
2 (θ, θ) > q
••
2 (θ, θ) although q
••
1 (θ) = q
••
1 (θ). Thus, unlike in
the multiple agent model, date 1 quality does not constitute a sufficient statistic for the
continuation of the contractual relationship: while a high type and a low type agent having
delivered the same level of date 1 quality have the same preferences at date 1, they are
treated differently in the continuation contract. The reason of this apparent paradox is that
the regulator does not treat the date 1 rents of a former high type agent in the same way as
those of a former low type agent. This endogenously leads to a sorting condition that makes
it optimal for her to screen the agent at date 0, in spite of pooling over date 1 quality.
4.4. Single versus Multiple Agents
We now compare regulation with a single agent and with a sequence of agents. The key
difference between the two setups is that, when the regulator contracts with a single agent,
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she is no longer constrained to use sequentially rational date 2 Markovian quality policies
contingent on date 1 quality and the agent’s date 1 type. To illustrate this point, suppose for
simplicity that the regular case obtains. Then, as shown by (54), the regulator commits to
an efficient quality level when (θ0, θ1) = (θ, θ), whereas she would find it optimal to distort
downward quality were she facing multiple agents in the same circumstances.14 Conversely,
as shown by (55), she commits to a higher level of distortions when (θ0, θ1) = (θ, θ), reflecting
the cost of providing dynamic incentives.
Although general comparison results are hard to obtain, one can unambiguously rank
date 1 quality levels in the two regulatory environments. Specifically, let q∗∗1 (q0) and q
∗∗
1
(q0)
be the quality levels at date 1 following respectively a high and low quality shock at date 0
when there are multiple agents. Then the following holds.
Proposition 10. If the regular case obtains and no pooling over date 1 qualities occurs in
the optimal long-term contract with a single agent, the quality spread at date 1 is wider with
a sequence of agents than with a single agent,
q∗∗1 (q0) > q
••
1 (θ) > q
••
1 (θ) > q
∗∗
1
(q0). (58)
This result reflects the difference in date 1 distortions that occur in the two regulatory
environments. With a sequence of agents, as in the basic model of Section 3, there is over-
provision of date 1 quality following a high quality shock at date 0. This is because the date
1 informational rent that has to be left when there is a further high quality shock at date 1 is
not internalized by the regulator, as opposed to when there is a single agent. Increasing date
1 quality allows the regulator to reduce this rent, which leads to the first half of (58). By
contrast, the date 1 distortions following a low quality shock at date 0 are larger with a single
agent than with a sequence of agents, reflecting the cost of making a deviation for a high
type agent less attractive at date 0. In turn, increasing date 1 quality allows the regulator to
alleviate this cost, which leads to the second half of (58).
A natural question is whether it is better from the regulator’s viewpoint to hire a single
agent or to contract with a sequence of agents.15 In our model, each option comes with costs
and benefits. On the one hand, by hiring a single agent, the regulator can directly condition
his date 1 compensation on his date 0 performance, while this occurs only indirectly through
date 1 quality when there is a sequence of agents. This in turn allows the regulator to
internalize some of the costs of providing incentives at date 1, as explained in Subsection
4.3.2. On the other hand, the fact that the same agent is rewarded over two periods raises
the cost of providing incentives at date 0, because the agent anticipates the impact of his
date 0 actions on his date 1 utility.
Which of these effects prevails is a priori unclear. Part of the difficulty is that it is
not possible to replicate the optimal contract with a sequence of agents in the environment
14The optimal distortion level is given by equation (107) in the Appendix. See also footnote 14.
15The answer to this question is not a priori obvious in our context because quality physically links periods
together, and agents must receive a non-negative utility at each date and in each state. By contrast, in Baron
and Besanko (1984), long-term contracts can be signed that need not satisfy this condition, and there is no
physical intertemporal link. When types are independent across periods, sequential contracting with multiple
agents is then suboptimal because it does not allow the regulator to extract the expected date 1 rent at date
0. This result still holds if, in addition, one modifies their model by imposing our restrictions on utilities: in
the absence of a physical intertemporal link, the optimal contract with a sequence of agents is then simply
the repetition of the optimal static contract, which can obviously be replicated in a long-term contract with
a single agent.
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with full commitment and a single agent. The problem lies with the incentive compatibility
constraint (39). To see this, let q∗∗
2
(q1) be the optimal quality level at date 2 given a date 1
quality level q1 and a low quality shock at date 1, in the model with a sequence of agents.
As for (23), Φ(q1, q∗∗2 (q1)) is a decreasing function of q1. Thus, as q
∗∗
1 (q0) > q
∗∗
1
(q0),
Φ(q∗∗1 (q0), q
∗∗
2
(q∗∗1 (q0))) < Φ(q
∗∗
1
(q0), q
∗∗
2
(q∗∗
1
(q0))). (59)
Moreover, in the model with a sequence of agents, the date 1 analogue of (12) is binding at
the optimum, as a date 1 agent facing a high quality shock is indifferent between reporting
truthfully or lying. Along with (59), this implies that the optimal allocation and transfers
in the model with a sequence of agents violate the incentive compatibility constraint (39).
Intuitively, this is because short-lived agents do not internalize the fall in future rents that
follows a high quality shock, while a long-lived agent does.
While a general comparison result seems hard to obtain, one can use the linear-quadratic
specification to compare the levels of welfare obtained in both regulatory environments.
Proposition 11. Consider the linear-quadratic case, and fix all the parameters of the model
except ν. When q0, θ and ∆θ are close enough to zero and λ < 1, there exists a threshold
ν∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that ex-ante social welfare is higher in the optimal contract with a sequence
of agents than in the optimal contract with a single agent if ν < ν∗.
The intuition for this result is that, when the probability of a high quality shock is low, a
regulator contracting with a single agent faces a high probability of having to distort heavily
the date 2 allocation in order to maintain the incentives of the agent at date 1. Moreover, the
benefits from fully internalizing the cost of providing incentives to a high type agent at date 1
are small since a high quality shock is relatively unlikely to occur. In these circumstances, the
regulator would be better off decoupling incentives in the two periods by rather contracting
with a sequence of agents.
4.5. No Commitment and the Ratchet Effect
Let us briefly consider the case where there is a single agent, but neither the regulator nor the
agent can commit to a long-term contract. At date 1, the regulator offers the same contract
than with a sequence of agents. At date 0, and for an initial level of quality q0, a contract is
simply a 4-tuple (u0, q1, u0, q1). Incentive compatibility at date 0 requires that
u0 − ψ(q1 − δq0 − θ) + νβΦ(q1, q∗∗2 (q1))
(60)
≥ u0 − ψ(q1 − δq0 − θ) + νβΦ(q1, q
∗∗
2
(q
1
)),
u0 − ψ(q1 − δq0 − θ) + νβΦ(q1, q
∗∗
2
(q
1
))
(61)
≥ u0 − ψ(q1 − δq0 − θ) + νβΦ(q1, q∗∗2 (q1)).
Because ψ is convex, an immediate implication of (60)—(61) is that q1 ≥ q1. In this context,
if a low type agent misrepresents his type at date 0, he will still contract with the regulator
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at date 1 and earn a positive rent on average: a “take-the-money-and-run” strategy is not
profitable, reflecting the fact that types are independent across periods. This represents a key
difference between this setup and a standard dynamic adverse selection model with perfectly
correlated types (Laffont and Tirole (1988)).
Since the agent must receive a non-negative utility in each state, an incentive feasible
contract must also satisfy the following date 0 limited liability constraints:
u0 − ψ(q1 − δq0 − θ) ≥ 0, (62)
u0 − ψ(q1 − δq0 − θ) ≥ 0. (63)
Given that, in analogy with the basic model, the date 1 rent is a decreasing function of date
1 quality, it is easy to check that (60) and (63) imply (62) provided that q1 ≥ q1. Adding
this as a constraint to the regulator’s problem, one can then solve for the optimal date 0
contract in a completely standard way. The incentive compatibility constraint (60) of the
high type agent is binding, as well as the limited liability constraint (63) of the low type agent.
Straightforward manipulations imply that the incentive compatibility constraint (61) of the
low type agent can be rewritten as Φ(q0, q1) ≥ Φ(q0, q1), which is satisfied when q1 ≥ q1.
Although the complications that usually arise in models of dynamic adverse selection are
absent in this model, the lack of commitment still generates a ratchet effect. Indeed, since the
regulator cannot commit to a compensation scheme at date 1, a high type agent anticipates
at date 0 that, by revealing his type, he will reduce his date 1 rent, since
Φ(q1, q
∗∗
2
(q1)) ≤ Φ(q1, q
∗∗
2
(q
1
)).
That is, the agent anticipates that being efficient today will increase the level of quality
tomorrow and therefore jeopardize his continuation rent. The corresponding date 0 rent of a
high type agent is therefore given by
Φ(q0, q1) + νβ
h
Φ(q
1
, q∗∗
2
(q
1
))− Φ(q1, q∗∗2 (q1))
i
.
To reduce this rent, it is typically optimal for the regulator to induce a pooling outcome at
date 0 when β is large.
It is straightforward to compare social welfare with a single agent and no commitment to
social welfare with a sequence of agents. Indeed, the optimal date 1 policies are the same in
both problems, while the incentive compatibility constraint at date 0 is more stringent with a
single agent, due to the ratchet effect. Therefore, when no commitment is feasible, it is better
from a social viewpoint to contract with a sequence of agents rather than to hire a single
agent. This contrasts with the findings of Lewis and Yildirim (2002, Proposition 4), who
show in a learning-by-doing model that when supply costs decrease with past production,
the regulator will prefer dealing with a single supplier rather than relying on less durable
franchises. The reason is that, in their model, the regulated firm’s informational rents are
higher when supply costs falls and the regulator demands more service, while these rents are
lower in our model when quality increases.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we explored the design of incentives for quality provision in a dynamic regulation
framework in which maintenance efforts and quality shocks have long-lasting effects. We
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considered in turn two regulatory frameworks, one with a sequence of short-term agents, and
one with a single long-term agent. When the regulator contracts with a sequence of agents,
asymmetries of information can result in over-provision of quality under optimal regulation,
reflecting a dynamic rent extraction motive. This contrasts with the standard prediction of a
static model of quality provision. In the linear-quadratic example, asymmetries of information
lead to higher (lower) maintenance efforts in the case of a high (low) quality shock, which
translates into more volatile quality growth than under symmetric information. When the
regulator hires a single agent to manage quality, over-provision of quality can also occur,
but through a different mechanism: if quality depreciates slowly and the discount factor is
large, optimal regulation can lead to over-provision of quality following a low quality shock,
and eventually to quality pooling, in order to deter deviations from agents facing high quality
shocks. In the linear-quadratic example, the regulator may prefer contracting with a sequence
of agents rather than hiring a single agent to avoid the cost of providing dynamic incentives.
This provides an argument in favor of shorter franchises even in the case in which all parties
can commit to a long-term contract.
This paper abstracts from several important features of quality regulation, which should
be investigated in future work. We have considered a project of fixed size, implicitly focusing
on quality as the sole dimension of differentiation. It would be interesting to extend the
analysis to the case where consumers care both about the quantity and the quality of output,
in order to explore the trade-off between the level and the quality of service, as well as the
interaction between the regulated firm’s prices and changes in quality. Another meaningful
extension of the analysis would be to relax the assumption that quality is verifiable by allowing
only imperfect signals of quality to be ascertained in court.
Finally, the techniques and insights developed in this paper might be also applied to
the study of other dynamic agency relationships in which the cost of providing incentives
is affected by an endogenous state variable as in our model. For instance, the owner of a
durable good such as a flat or a building might be concerned with the maintenance efforts
exerted by the successive renters, while the latter may differ with respect to the kind of use
they will make of the property–they may be for instance careful or careless. The state of
the property would then vary over time as a function of the successive renters’ types and
maintenance efforts, while the value of the property would be endogenously determined by
the whole sequence of rental contracts offered by the owner. As in our model, a succession of
careful renters may increase the state of the property over and above the first-best level. In
this context, it might be interesting to endogenize the sequence of renters’ types by studying
the incentives of different types of renters to select properties of different qualities, and the
impact of this self-selection mechanism on the value of property over time. These important
questions are left for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Denote by T ∗ and T ∗∗ the Bellman operators associated to (5) and (20)
respectively. The following lemma holds.
Lemma A.1. Let f and g be two real-valued functions over R+ that are both bounded, strictly
increasing, strictly concave and continuously differentiable over R++. Then, if g0 ≥ f 0 over R++,
(T ∗∗g)0 > (T ∗f)0 over R++.
Proof. Standard considerations (see for instance Stokey and Lucas (1989, §4)) imply that T ∗f and
T ∗∗g are bounded, strictly increasing, strictly concave and continuously differentiable over R++. The
condition ψ0(0) = 0 ensures that the optimal effort levels remain strictly positive. Fix q > 0. The
first-order conditions corresponding to the program that defines (T ∗f)(q) are
βf 0(q∗f (q)) = (1 + λ)ψ
0(q∗f (q)− δq − θ), (64)
βf 0(q∗
f
(q)) = (1 + λ)ψ0(q∗
f
(q)− δq − θ). (65)
By the Envelope Theorem,
(T ∗f)0(q) = S0(q) + νδ(1 + λ)ψ0(q∗f (q)− δq − θ) + (1− ν)δ(1 + λ)ψ0(q∗f (q)− δq − θ).
Using (64)—(65), this can be rewritten as:
(T ∗f)0(q) = S0(q) + νβδf 0(q∗f (q)) + (1− ν)βδf 0(q∗f (q)). (66)
Similarly, the first-order conditions corresponding to the program that defines (T ∗∗g)(q) are
βg0(q∗∗g (q)) = (1 + λ)ψ
0(q∗∗g (q)− δq − θ), (67)
βg0(q∗∗
g
(q)) = (1 + λ)ψ0(q∗∗
g
(q)− δq − θ) + λν
1− ν Φ2(q, q
∗∗
g
(q)). (68)
By the Envelope Theorem,
(T ∗∗g)0(q) = S0(q)+νδ(1+λ)ψ0(q∗∗g (q)−δq−θ)+(1−ν)δ(1+λ)ψ0(q∗∗g (q)− δq−θ)−νλΦ1(q, q
∗∗
g
(q)).
Using (67)—(68) together with Φ1 = −δΦ2, this can be rewritten as:
(T ∗∗g)0(q) = S0(q) + νβδg0(q∗∗g (q)) + (1− ν)βδg0(q∗∗g (q)). (69)
Using the fact that f and g are strictly concave, that ψ is strictly convex over R+ and that g0 ≥ f 0,
one can check from (64) and (67) that g0(q∗∗g (q)) ≥ f 0(q∗f (q)). Since Φ2(q, q∗∗g (q)) > 0, it follows in a
similar way from (65) and (68) that g0(q∗∗
g
(q)) > f 0(q∗
f
(q)). Therefore, by (66) and (69), one obtains
that (T ∗∗g)0(q) > (T ∗f)0(q), which implies the result since q is arbitrarily chosen. ¤
We are now ready to complete the proof of Proposition 1. The fact that T ∗ and T ∗∗ are contractions
with unique fixed points V ∗ and V ∗∗ over the space of bounded continuous functions defined over
R+ ensures that V ∗ = limn→∞ T ∗nS and V ∗∗ = limn→∞ T ∗∗nS pointwise over R+. Since V ∗ and
V ∗∗ are bounded, concave and differentiable over R++, this implies that V ∗0 = limn→∞(T ∗nS)0 and
V ∗∗0 = limn→∞(T ∗∗nS)0 pointwise over R++ (Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 25.7)). By Lemma A.1,
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(T ∗∗nS)0 > (T ∗nS)0 over R++ for each n ∈ N \ {0}. Taking limits, it follows that V ∗∗0 ≥ V ∗0 over
R++. Applying Lemma A.1 again and using the fact that T ∗V ∗ = V ∗ and T ∗∗V ∗∗ = V ∗∗, one obtains
that V ∗∗0 > V ∗0 over R++, as claimed. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2. For each i ∈ {∗, ∗∗}, the effort mappings ei and ei are strictly decreasing, or,
equivalently, the mappings q 7→ qi(q)− δq and q 7→ qi(q)− δq are strictly decreasing. Since δ ∈ (0, 1)
and both qi(0) and qi(0) are strictly positive, and since the mappings qi and qi are strictly increasing
with qi > qi, this implies that there are exactly two points qi+ > qi− > 0 such that qi(qi+) = qi+ and
qi(qi−) = qi−. Note that q∗∗+ > q∗+ since q∗∗ > q∗ over R++. It is easy to verify that both [0, qi−)
and (qi+,∞] are transient sets for the transition function P i, so that one can restrict the analysis to
[qi−, qi+]. Because the mappings qi and qi are strictly increasing and continuous, P i is monotone and
satisfies the Feller property. Moreover, since limn→∞ q
in(qi−) = qi+ and limn→∞ q
in(qi+) = qi−, it
follows that for any q ∈ (qi−, qi+), there exists an integer n ≥ 1 such that P in(qi−, [q, qi+]) ≥ νn and
P in(qi+, [qi−, q]) ≥ (1−ν)n. Thus P i satisfies the mixing Assumption 12.1 in Stokey and Lucas (1989)
over [qi−, qi+]. As a result of this, there exists a unique probability measure μi over this interval that
is invariant under P i in the sense that μi(A) =
R
P i(q,A)μi(dq) for any Borel subset A (Stokey and
Lucas (1989, Theorem 12.12)). We now prove that max suppμi = qi+, which concludes the proof
as q∗∗+ > q∗+. Suppose instead that qi+ > max suppμi. Then, since qi(q) > q for any q < qi+,
qi(q) > max suppμi for any q close enough to max suppμi. By definition of suppμi, it follows that
μi((qi)−1((max suppμi, qi+))) > 0. However, as μi is invariant under P i, one then obtains that
μi((max suppμi, qi+)) =
Z
P i(q, (max suppμi, qi+))μi(dq) ≥ νμi((qi)−1((max suppμi, qi+))) > 0,
a contradiction. Therefore max suppμi = qi+, as claimed, and similarly min suppμi = qi−. Finally,
note that Theorem 12.12 in Stokey and Lucas (1989) also ensures that for any initial quality level,
the distribution of quality converges weakly to μi. This concludes the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3. We first solve (5) and (20) without restrictions on quality levels, and verify
that (32) holds. Using (27)—(28) and (29)—(30) together with (26), and identifying terms in q2 in (5)
and (20), we first obtain that B∗ = B∗∗ = B, where B is the positive solution to
B = b+
βδ2c(1 + λ)B
βB + c(1 + λ)
. (70)
Next, identifying terms in q in (5) and (20), we obtain that
A∗ =
a[βB + c(1 + λ)]− βδcB(1 + λ)Eθ
βB + c(1 + λ)(1− βδ) (71)
and
A∗∗ =
a[βB + c(1 + λ)]− βδcB(1 + λ)Eθ + νβδcBλ∆θ
βB + c(1 + λ)(1− βδ) . (72)
Hence A∗∗ > A∗, and since B∗ = B∗∗ = B, it follows from (27)—(29) that q∗∗(q) > q∗(q) > q∗(q),
as expected. Next, from (28) and (30), q∗(q) > q∗∗(q) if and only if βA∗ > βA∗∗ − λν1−ν c∆θ. Using
(71)—(72), this condition can be rewritten as:
βB + c(1 + λ)(1− βδ)
1− ν > β
2δB,
which clearly holds as (β, δ, ν) ∈ (0, 1)3 and B > 0. Hence q∗(q) > q∗∗(q), and (32) follows. We
now provide parameter and range restrictions under which the social value functions V ∗ and V ∗∗ thus
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obtained are economically meaningful. Define q∗+ and q∗∗+ as in the proof of Proposition 2. By
construction, the interval [0, q∗∗+] is invariant under both the transition functions P ∗ and P ∗∗. We
shall therefore assume that q0 initially belongs to [0, q
∗∗+] and restrict our attention to this interval.
A necessary condition for our solutions to (5) and (20) to be economically meaningful over [0, q∗∗+]
is that q∗∗+ < ab . Using (29) to solve for q
∗∗+, and taking advantage of (70) and (72), one can check
after straightforward algebraic manipulations that a sufficient condition for this to occur is
θ − βδEθ
(1− δ)(1− βδ) +
νβδλ∆θ
(1 + λ)(1− δ)(1− βδ) <
a
b
. (73)
We shall hereafter assume that (73) holds. This condition immediately implies that
(1− δ)a
b
> θ. (74)
Using (74) together with (70)—(72), one can in turn check that
A∗∗
B
>
A∗
B
>
a
b
. (75)
The inequalities (75) capture the intuitive fact that, as long as the surplus function S is increasing,
so are the social value functions V ∗ and V ∗∗. In particular, the latter are strictly increasing over
[0, q∗∗+]. We now investigate under which conditions efforts remain strictly positive over this interval.
It is easy to check from (27) and (29) that for each i ∈ {∗, ∗∗} and q ∈ [0, q∗∗+],
ei(q) =
βB
βB + c(1 + λ)
µ
Ai
B
− δq − θ
¶
>
βB
βB + c(1 + λ)
h
(1− δ)a
b
− θ
i
> 0,
where the first inequality follows from (75) and the fact that q∗∗+ < ab , and the second from (74).
Hence efforts conditional on a high quality shock are strictly positive, and since e∗(q) > e∗(q), so are
efforts conditional on a low quality shock under symmetric information. To conclude, one must check
that e∗∗(q) ≥ ∆θ for all q ∈ [0, q∗∗+], so that we are justified in using the quadratic specification of ψ
when writing down the informational rent of the high type agent, see (31). From (30), one has
e∗∗(q) =
βB
βB + c(1 + λ)
µ
A∗∗
B
− δq − θ
¶
− λνc∆θ
(1− ν)[βB + c(1 + λ)] .
Proceeding as above, we obtain that for each q ∈ [0, q∗∗+],
βB
βB + c(1 + λ)
µ
A∗∗
B
− δq − θ
¶
>
βB
βB + c(1 + λ)
h
(1− δ)a
b
− θ
i
.
Hence a sufficient condition for e∗∗(q) ≥ ∆θ to hold for all q ∈ [0, q∗∗+] is thath
(1− δ)a
b
− θ
i
βB >
∙
λνc
1− ν + βB + c(1 + λ)
¸
∆θ. (76)
Note from (70) that B is independent of θ, θ and ∆θ. Hence, given (74), (76) typically holds if
∆θ is close enough to zero. It is straightforward to find parameter values such that (73) and (76)
simultaneously hold. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4. Fix some t = 0, 1, . . . . From (27)—(30), E [q∗t+1 | q∗t = q] > E [q∗∗t+1 | q∗∗t = q] if
and only if βA∗ > βA∗∗ − λνc∆θ. Using (71)—(72), this condition can be rewritten as:
βB + c(1 + λ)(1− βδ) > β2δB,
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which clearly holds as (β, δ, ν) ∈ (0, 1)3 and B > 0. Therefore (33) follows. As for (34), it is an
immediate consequence of (32). For further reference, note that
Var [q∗t+1 |q∗t = q] =
∙
c(1 + λ)
βB + c(1 + λ)
¸2
Varθ, (77)
Var [q∗∗t+1 |q∗∗t = q] =
∙
c(1 + λ)
βB + c(1 + λ)
¸2
Varθ +
λν2c2∆θ2[νλ+ 2(1− ν)(1 + λ)]
(1− ν)[βB + c(1 + λ)]2 , (78)
as is easy to check from (27)—(30). ¥
Proof of Proposition 5. From (27)—(28) and (29)—(30), it follows that for each t = 0, 1, . . . ,
E [q∗t+1] =
βA∗ + c(1 + λ)(Eθ + δE [q∗t ])
βB + c(1 + λ)
,
E [q∗∗t+1] =
βA∗∗ − λνc∆θ + c(1 + λ)(Eθ + δE [q∗∗t ])
βB + c(1 + λ)
.
Taking limits as t goes to infinity, one obtains that
Eμ∗ =
βA∗ + c(1 + λ)Eθ
βB + c(1 + λ)(1− δ) ,
Eμ∗∗ =
βA∗∗ − λνc∆θ + c(1 + λ)Eθ
βB + c(1 + λ)(1− δ) ,
from which (35) follows as βA∗ > βA∗∗ − λνc∆θ, see the proof of Proposition 4. Next, for each
i ∈ {∗, ∗∗} and t = 0, 1, . . . ,
E [Var [qit+1 |qit]] = E [(qit+1)2]− E [E [qit+1 |qit]2]
= E [(qit+1)
2]− E
"∙
E [qit+1] +
cδ(1 + λ)(qit − E[qit])
βB + c(1 + λ)
¸2#
= Var [qit+1]−
∙
cδ(1 + λ)
βB + c(1 + λ)
¸2
Var [qit],
where the second equality follows from (27)—(28) and (29)—(30). Using (77)—(78), this yields
Var [q∗t+1] =
∙
c(1 + λ)
βB + c(1 + λ)
¸2
(Varθ + δ2Var [q∗t ]),
Var [q∗∗t+1] =
∙
c(1 + λ)
βB + c(1 + λ)
¸2
(Varθ + δ2Var [q∗∗t ]) +
λν2c2∆θ2[νλ+ 2(1− ν)(1 + λ)]
(1− ν)[βB + c(1 + λ)]2
for each t = 0, 1, . . . . Taking limits as t goes to infinity, one obtains that
Varμ∗ =
c2(1 + λ)2Varθ
[βB + c(1 + λ)]2 − c2δ2(1 + λ)2 ,
Varμ∗∗ =
c2(1 + λ)2Varθ
[βB + c(1 + λ)]2 − c2δ2(1 + λ)2 +
λν2c2∆θ2[νλ+ 2(1− ν)(1 + λ)]
(1− ν){[βB + c(1 + λ)]2 − c2δ2(1 + λ)2} ,
from which (36) follows. Hence the result. ¥
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Proof of Proposition 6. Using date 1 and 2 qualities and date 0 rents as control variables, the regulator’s
problem can be formulated as follows:
max
(q˜1,q˜2,U˜0)
{E [−(1 + λ)ψ(q˜1(θ0)− δq0 − θ0) + βS(q˜1(θ0))
− (1 + λ)βψ(q˜2(θ0, θ1)− δq˜1(θ0)− θ1) + β2S(q˜2(θ0, θ1))] (79)
−λνU˜0(θ)− λ(1− ν)U˜0(θ)− λν2βΦ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ))−λν(1− ν)βΦ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ))},
subject to the constraints
U˜0(θ) + νβΦ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ)) ≥ U˜0(θ) +Φ(q0, q˜1(θ)) + νβΦ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ)), (80)
U˜0(θ) + νβΦ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ)) ≥ U˜0(θ)− Φ(q0, q˜1(θ)) + νβΦ(q˜1(θ), q˜2(θ, θ)), (81)
U˜0(θ) ≥ 0, (82)
U˜0(θ) ≥ 0. (83)
Let (q••1 , q
••
2 , U
••
0 ) be the solution to this problem. One first has the following lemma.
Lemma A.2. q••1 (θ) ≥ q••1 (θ).
Proof. An immediate implication of (80)—(81) is that Φ(q0, q••1 (θ)) ≥ Φ(q0, q••1 (θ)). Since Φ(q, q) is
strictly increasing in q for q > δq + θ, we need only to show that q••1 (θ) > δq0 + θ. Suppose the
contrary holds, and consider the following modification of (q••1 , q
••
2 , U
••
0 ). First, keep q˜1(θ), q˜2, and
U˜0(θ) the same as in the original contract, so that (83) is preserved. Second, let q˜1(θ) = δq0+θ+ε for
some ε > 0, and let U˜0(θ) = U••0 (θ) + νβΦ(q••1 (θ), q••2 (θ, θ))− νβΦ(q˜1(θ), q••2 (θ, θ)) so as to maintain
the same level of intertemporal rents for a good type agent at date 0. As a result of this, (80) is
preserved. Next, since q˜1(θ) > q••1 (θ) and Φ is increasing with respect to its second argument, (81)
is also preserved. Finally, since q˜1(θ) > q••1 (θ) and Φ is decreasing with respect to its first argument,
one obtains that U˜0(θ) ≥ U••0 (θ) so that (82) is preserved. The new contract is therefore incentive
feasible, and yields the same expected intertemporal rent to the agent as the original contract. The
condition ψ0(0) = 0 then implies that, for ε close enough to zero, this contract yields a strictly higher
expected social welfare at date 0 than the original contract, a contradiction. ¤
It turns out that which constraints are binding at the optimum depends on the sign of the following
quantities:
∆r = Φ(q0, q••1 (θ)) + νβ
£
Φ(q••1 (θ), q
••
2 (θ, θ))− Φ(q••1 (θ), q••2 (θ, θ))
¤
, (84)
∆i = −Φ(q0, q••1 (θ)) + νβ
£
Φ(q••1 (θ), q
••
2 (θ, θ))− Φ(q••1 (θ), q••2 (θ, θ))
¤
. (85)
∆r is the date 0 rent that must be left to a high type agent whenever (39) and (42) are the binding
constraints. For (41) to be satisfied, one must then have ∆r ≥ 0. Similarly, ∆i is the date 0 rent that
must be left to a low type agent whenever (40) and (41) are the binding constraints. For (42) to be
satisfied, one must then have ∆i ≥ 0. The following lemma holds.
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Lemma A.3. ∆r and ∆i cannot be both non-negative unless they are both equal to zero. Moreover,
at least one of the following assertions is true:
(i) ∆r ≥ 0 ≥ ∆i, in which case (39) and (42) are binding;
(ii) ∆i ≥ 0 ≥ ∆r, in which case (40) and (41) are binding.
Proof. We first establish that ∆r and ∆i cannot be both non-negative unless they are both equal to
zero. Suppose the contrary holds. Then, by (84)—(85),
Φ(q0, q••1 (θ)) ≥ νβ
£
Φ(q••1 (θ), q
••
2 (θ, θ))− Φ(q••1 (θ), q••2 (θ, θ))
¤
≥ Φ(q0, q••1 (θ)),
with at least one strict inequality. This however implies that Φ(q0, q••1 (θ)) > Φ(q0, q••1 (θ)), which
contradicts (39)—(40). This implies the claim.
Suppose next that ∆r ≥ 0 at the optimum contract. Observing that one can rewrite (39) as
u••0 (θ) − ψ(e••0 (θ)) ≥ u••0 (θ) − ψ(e••0 (θ)) + ∆r using (43) and (84), it necessarily follows that (42)
is binding, since otherwise reducing u••0 (θ) and u••0 (θ) by some small amount ε > 0 would preserve
all constraints and increase social welfare. Similarly, (39) must be binding since otherwise reducing
u••0 (θ) by some small amount ε > 0 would preserve all constraints and increase social welfare. Similar
arguments imply that if ∆i ≥ 0 at the optimum contract, then (40) and (41) must be binding.
To conclude the proof, we must only check that ∆r and ∆i cannot be both strictly negative.
Suppose the contrary holds. Then, observing that one can rewrite (39) as u••0 (θ) − ψ(e••0 (θ)) ≥
u••0 (θ) − ψ(e••0 (θ)) +∆r using (84), and (40) as u••0 (θ) − ψ(e••0 (θ)) ≥ u••0 (θ) − ψ(e••0 (θ)) +∆i using
(85), it is clear that (39) and (42) cannot be both binding, as this would violate (41) since ∆r < 0,
and that (40) and (41) cannot be both binding, as this would violate (42) since ∆i < 0. Now, suppose
that (41) is slack. Then (42) must be binding, since otherwise reducing u••0 (θ) and u••0 (θ) by some
small amount ε > 0 would preserve all constraints and increase social welfare. Thus, as (39) and (42)
cannot be both binding, (39) must be slack. But (39) and (41) cannot both be slack, since otherwise
reducing u••0 (θ) by some small amount ε > 0 would preserve all constraints and increase social welfare.
Hence, (41) must be binding, contrary to the assumption. A similar reasoning implies that (42) must
be binding as well. Since (39) and (42) cannot be both binding, and similarly for (40) and (41), this
implies that (39)—(40) are slack. Therefore, for a given value of q0, the function q
••
2 solves
max
q˜2
{E [−(1 + λ)ψ(q˜2(θ0, θ1)− δq2,1(θ0)− θ1) + βS(q˜2(θ0, θ1))]
−λν2Φ(q••1 (θ), q˜2(θ, θ))−λν(1− ν)Φ(q••1 (θ), q˜2(θ, θ))}.
It follows that q••2 (θ, θ) = Q1,2(q••1 (θ)) and q••2 (θ, θ) = Q1,2(q••1 (θ)), where for each q1 ≥ 0, Q1,2(q1)
is implicitly defined by16
βS0(Q1,2(q1)) = (1 + λ)ψ0(Q1,2(q1)− δq1 − θ) +
λν
1− ν Φ2(q1,Q1,2(q1)). (86)
The condition ψ0(0) = 0 ensures that E1,1(q1) = Q1,2(q1) − δq1 − θ remains strictly positive for each
q1 ≥ 0. Using now standard arguments, it is easy to check from (86) that the function E1,1 is strictly
decreasing, which implies in turn that the informational rent
Φ(q1,Q1,2(q1)) = ψ(E1,1(q1))− ψ(E1,1(q1)−∆θ)
16Note that (86) is formally analogous to the first-order condition (22) for q∗∗(q) derived in the stationary
model with multiple agents. Indeed, it is easy to see that (86) gives the sequentially rational date 2 optimal
quality policy given that θ1 = θ, see (107).
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is a strictly decreasing function of q1. Since ∆r < 0 and q••1 (θ) ≥ q••1 (θ) by Lemma A.2, one has
0 ≤ Φ(q0, q••1 (θ))
< νβ
£
Φ(q••1 (θ), q
••
2 (θ, θ))− Φ(q••1 (θ), q••2 (θ, θ))
¤
= νβ
h
Φ(q••1 (θ),Q1,2(q••1 (θ)))− Φ(q••1 (θ),Q1,2(q••1 (θ)))
i
≤ 0,
a contradiction. Hence the result. ¤
To determine which of cases (i) or (ii) of Lemma A.3 holds, we first need the following result.
Lemma A.4. ∆i ≤ 0.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that ∆i > 0. Then, by Lemma A.3, (40) and (41) are
binding. Moreover, a low type agent is left with a strictly positive rent ∆i at date 0, so that (42) is
slack. Therefore, for a given value of q0, the function q2,2 solves
max
q˜2
©
E [−(1 + λ)ψ(q˜2(θ0, θ1)− q2,1(θ0)− θ1) + βS(q˜2(θ0, θ1))]− λνΦ(q••1 (θ), q˜2(θ, θ))
ª
.
It follows that q••2 (θ, θ) = Q2,2(q••1 (θ)) and q••2 (θ, θ) = Q3,2(q••1 (θ)), where for each q1 ≥ 0, Q2,2(q1)
and Q3,2(q1) are implicitly defined by
βS0(Q2,2(q1)) = (1 + λ)ψ0(Q2,2(q1)− δq1 − θ) +
λ
1− ν Φ2(q1,Q2,2(q1)). (87)
βS0(Q3,2(q1)) = (1 + λ)ψ0(Q3,2(q1)− δq1 − θ), (88)
The condition ψ0(0) = 0 ensures that E2,1(q1) = Q2,2(q1)− δq1 − θ and E3,1(q1) = Q3,2(q1)− δq1 − θ
remain strictly positive for each q1 ≥ 0. Since one clearly has Q2,2(q1) < Q3,2(q1) by (88)—(87), this
implies that Φ(q1,Q2,2(q1)) < Φ(q1,Q3,2(q1)) for each q1 ≥ 0. Using now standard arguments, it is
easy to check from (88) that the function E3,1 is strictly decreasing, which implies in turn that the
informational rent
Φ(q1,Q3,2(q1)) = ψ(E3,1(q1))− ψ(E3,1(q1)−∆θ)
is a strictly decreasing function of q1. Since ∆i > 0 and q••1 (θ) ≥ q••1 (θ) by Lemma A.2, one has
0 ≤ Φ(q0, q••1 (θ))
< νβ
£
Φ(q••1 (θ), q
••
2 (θ, θ))− Φ(q••1 (θ), q••2 (θ, θ))
¤
= νβ
h
Φ(q••1 (θ),Q2,2(q••1 (θ)))− Φ(q••1 (θ),Q3,2(q••1 (θ)))
i
< νβ
h
Φ(q••1 (θ),Q3,2(q••1 (θ)))− Φ(q••1 (θ),Q3,2(q••1 (θ)))
i
≤ 0,
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a contradiction. Hence the result. ¤
Finally, the following lemma rules out the case ∆i = 0 > ∆r.
Lemma A.5. ∆r ≥ 0.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that ∆r < 0. Then, by Lemmas A.3 and A.4, ∆i = 0, so
that (40)—(42) are binding. Observing that one can rewrite (39) as u••0 (θ) − ψ(e••0 (θ)) ≥ u••0 (θ) −
ψ(e••0 (θ)) + ∆r using (84), it necessarily follows that (39) is slack. Now turn to the formulation
(79)—(83) of the regulator’s problem. We know from the proof of Lemma A.2 that q••1 (θ) > δq0 + θ.
It is easy to check that this implies that (80)—(83) satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker constraint qualification
conditions at the optimum. Denote by η1, η2, η3 and η4 the corresponding multipliers. As (80) is
slack at the optimum, η1 = 0. It follows that q••2 (θ, θ) = Q4,2(q••1 (θ)) and q••2 (θ, θ) = Q5,2(q••1 (θ)),
where for each q1 ≥ 0, Q4,2(q1) and Q5,2(q1) are implicitly defined by
βS0(Q4,2(q1)) = (1 + λ)ψ0(Q4,2(q1)− δq1 − θ) +
λν + η2
1− ν Φ2(q1,Q4,2(q1)), (89)
βS0(Q5,2(q1)) = (1 + λ)ψ0(Q5,2(q1)− δq1 − θ) +
[λ(1− ν)− η2]ν
(1− ν)2 Φ2(q1,Q5,2(q1)). (90)
Optimizing with respect to U˜0(θ) yields η2 + η4 = λ(1 − ν), so that η2 ≤ λ(1 − ν). The condition
ψ0(0) = 0 then ensures that E5,1(q1) = Q5,2(q1) − δq1 − θ remains strictly positive for each q1 ≥ 0.
Since one clearly has Q4,2(q1) ≤ Q5,2(q1) by (89)—(90), Φ(q1,Q4,2(q1)) ≤ Φ(q1,Q5,2(q1)) for each
q1 ≥ 0. Using now standard arguments, it is easy to check from (90) that the function E5,1 is strictly
decreasing, which implies in turn that the informational rent
Φ(q1,Q5,2(q1)) = ψ(E5,1(q1))− ψ(E5,1(q1)−∆θ)
is a strictly decreasing function of q1. Since ∆r < 0 and q••1 (θ) ≥ q••1 (θ) by Lemma A.2, one has
0 ≤ Φ(q0, q••1 (θ))
< νβ
£
Φ(q••1 (θ), q
••
2 (θ, θ))− Φ(q••1 (θ), q••2 (θ, θ))
¤
= νβ
h
Φ(q••1 (θ),Q4,2(q••1 (θ)))− Φ(q••1 (θ),Q5,2(q••1 (θ)))
i
≤ νβ
h
Φ(q••1 (θ),Q5,2(q••1 (θ)))− Φ(q••1 (θ),Q5,2(q••1 (θ)))
i
≤ 0,
a contradiction. Hence the result. ¤
To conclude the proof, simply observe that Lemmas A.4 and A.5 imply that case (i) of Lemma
A.3 obtains. Thus (39) and (42) are binding, and the result follows. ¥
Proof of Proposition 7. We first prove that q••2 (θ, θ) > q
••
2 (θ, θ). In the regular case, this follows
from (54)—(55) together with q••1 (θ) ≥ q••1 (θ). Consider next the irregular case. Two subcases must
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be distinguished. Suppose first that (81) or equivalently (49) is binding. From the proof of Lemma
A.2, we know that q••1 (θ) > δq0 + θ, and hence Φ(q0, q••1 (θ)) = Φ(q0, q••1 (θ)) > 0. Since U••0 (θ) = 0,
it follows that Φ(q••1 (θ), q••2 (θ, θ)) > Φ(q••1 (θ), q••2 (θ, θ)), which implies that q••2 (θ, θ) > q••2 (θ, θ) as
claimed. Suppose next that (81) or equivalently (49) is slack. Since U••0 (θ) = 0, Φ(q••1 (θ), q••2 (θ, θ)) ≥
Φ(q••1 (θ), q••2 (θ, θ)). As (49) is slack, we need only to prove that this implies that q••2 (θ, θ)−q••2 (θ, θ) ≥
δ[q••1 (θ) − q••1 (θ)]. Again, this will be the case if q••2 (θ, θ) > δq••1 (θ) + θ. Suppose the contrary
holds, and consider the following modification of (q••1 , q
••
2 , U
••
0 ). First, keep q˜1, q˜2(θ, θ), q˜2(θ, θ),
q˜2(θ, θ) and U˜0 the same as in the original contract, so that (82)—(83) are preserved. Second, let
q˜2(θ, θ) = δq••1 (θ) + θ + ε for some ε > 0. Since q˜2(θ, θ) > q••2 (θ, θ) and Φ is increasing in its second
argument, (80) is preserved. Moreover, since (81) is slack, it is preserved in the new contract if ε is close
enough to zero, which ensures that the new contract is incentive feasible. The condition ψ0(0) = 0 then
implies that, for ε close enough to zero, this contract yields a strictly higher expected social welfare
at date 0 than the original contract, a contradiction. Thus q••2 (θ, θ) > δq
••
1 (θ)+ θ, which implies that
q••2 (θ, θ) > q••2 (θ, θ) as claimed. Note that (Φ(q••1 (θ), q••2 (θ, θ)),Φ(q••1 (θ), q••2 (θ, θ))) 6= (0, 0), so that
(49)—(50) satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker constraint qualification conditions at the optimum.
We now show that the level of distortions at date 1 is strictly higher following θ0 = θ than following
θ0 = θ. Let ξ2 be the multiplier associated to (50). Then, from (49)—(51), the first-order conditions
for q••2 (θ, θ) and q••2 (θ, θ) are given by
βS0(q••2 (θ, θ)) = (1 + λ)ψ
0(q••2 (θ, θ)− δq••1 (θ)− θ) +
ξ2
1− ν Φ2(q
••
1 (θ), q
••
2 (θ, θ)), (91)
βS0(q••2 (θ, θ)) = (1 + λ)ψ
0(q••2 (θ, θ)− δq••1 (θ)− θ) +
(λ− ξ2)ν
(1− ν)2 Φ2(q
••
1 (θ), q
••
2 (θ, θ)). (92)
We need to prove that (λ − ξ2)ν > ξ2(1 − ν) or equivalently λν > ξ2. If ξ2 = 0 this is immediate.
Suppose next that ξ2 > 0, so that (50) is binding. Then, proceeding as above, one obtains that
q••2 (θ, θ) − δq••1 (θ) ≥ q••2 (θ, θ) − δq••1 (θ). Since ψ0 is convex, it therefore follows from (18) that
Φ2(q••1 (θ), q••2 (θ, θ)) ≥ Φ2(q••1 (θ), q••2 (θ, θ)). Suppose now that ξ2 ≥ λν. Then the right-hand side
of (91) is greater than or equal to the right-hand side of (92). This is however impossible since
q••2 (θ, θ) > q••2 (θ, θ) and S is strictly concave. Thus λν > ξ2, and the result follows. ¥
Proof of Proposition 8. Suppose that pooling over date 1 qualities occurs in equilibrium, and let ξ1 and
ξ2 be the multipliers associated to (49)—(50). Using the Envelope Theorem, the first-order conditions
for q••1 (θ) = q
••
1 (θ) = q
p
1 can be written as follows:
βS0(qp1) = (1 + λ)ψ
0(qp1 − δq0 − θ)− βδ(1 + λ)E
£
ψ0(q••2 (θ, θ1))− δq
p
1 − θ1)
¤
(93)
− ξ1
ν
+ ξ2βΦ1(q
p
1 , q
••
2 (θ, θ)),
βS0(qp1) = (1 + λ)ψ
0(qp1 − δq0 − θ)− βδ(1 + λ)E[ψ0(q••2 (θ, θ1))− δq
p
1 − θ1)]
+
λν
1− ν Φ2(q0, q
p
1) +
λνβ
1− ν Φ1(q
p
1 , q
••
2 (θ, θ)), (94)
+
ξ1
1− ν −
ξ2
1− ν Φ2(q0, q
p
1)−
ξ2νβ
1− ν Φ1(q
p
1 , q
••
2 (θ, θ)),
The following lemma holds.
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Lemma A.6. If q0 is close enough to zero, q
p
1 − δq0 > q••2 (θ, θ)− δq
p
1 .
Proof. Using the definition of Φ, and in particular the fact that Φ1 = −δΦ2, one can rewrite (93) as:
βS0(qp1) = (1 + λ)ψ
0(qp1 − δq0 − θ)− (1 + λ)Φ2(q0, q
p
1)− βδ(1 + λ)E
£
ψ0(q••2 (θ, θ1))− δq
p
1 − θ1)
¤
(95)
− ξ1
ν
− ξ2βδΦ2(qp1 , q••2 (θ, θ)).
Since S is concave and ψ is convex, and since λν > ξ2 as shown in the proof of Proposition 7, it follows
from (92) and (95) that if q••2 (θ, θ) − δq
p
1 ≥ q
p
1 − δq0, then q
p
1 ≥ q••2 (θ, θ) and therefore q0 ≥ q
p
1 . But
if q0 is close to zero, this is inconsistent with a positive effort being exerted at date 0 by a high type
agent, in contradiction to (93). Hence qp1 − δq0 > q••2 (θ, θ)− δq
p
1 , as claimed. ¤
We are now ready to complete the proof. Using (52)—(53) together with the definition of Φ, one
can rearrange (93)—(94) to obtain
ξ1
µ
1
ν
+
1
1− ν
¶
= −(1− ν)βδ(1 + λ)
£
ψ0(q••2 (θ, θ)− δq
p
1 − θ)− ψ0(q••2 (θ, θ)− δq
p
1 − θ)
¤
−
µ
1 + λ+
λν
1− ν
¶
Φ2(q0, q
p
1) +
λνβδ
1− ν Φ2(q
p
1 , q
••
2 (θ, θ)) (96)
− ξ2βδΦ2(qp1 , q••2 (θ, θ)) +
ξ2
1− ν Φ2(q0, q
p
1)−
ξ2νβδ
1− ν Φ2(q
p
1 , q
••
2 (θ, θ)).
Since q••2 (θ, θ) > q••2 (θ, θ) by Proposition 7, and since the functions ψ and Φ(q
p
1 , ·) are convex, it
therefore follows that
ξ1
ν
< (λν − ξ2)[βδΦ2(qp1 , q••2 (θ, θ))− Φ2(q0, q
p
1)]. (97)
By Lemma A.6, qp1 − δq0 > q••2 (θ, θ)− δq
p
1 for q0 close enough to zero. Hence, since a high type agent
exerts a positive effort at date 0, Φ2(q0, q
p
1) > Φ2(q
p
1 , q
••
2 (θ, θ)). Moreover, λν > ξ2 as shown in the
proof of Proposition 7. Hence (97) implies that if βδ ≤ 1, then ξ1 < 0, a contradiction. Thus pooling
over date 1 qualities can occur only if βδ > 1, as claimed. ¥
Proof of Proposition 9. To construct the optimal contract, we first conjecture that (50) is slack at the
optimum, which we will verify ex-post. As a result of this, the multiplier ξ2 of (50) is equal to zero.
From (52)—(55), we obtain
q••2 (θ, θ) =
βa+ c(1 + λ)[θ + δq••1 (θ)]
βb+ c(1 + λ)
, (98)
q••2 (θ, θ) =
βa+ c(1 + λ)[θ + δq••1 (θ)]
βb+ c(1 + λ)
, (99)
q••2 (θ, θ) =
βa+ c(1 + λ)[θ + δq••1 (θ)]
βb+ c(1 + λ)
, (100)
q••2 (θ, θ) =
βa− λν(1−ν)2 c∆θ + c(1 + λ)[θ + δq••1 (θ)]
βb+ c(1 + λ)
. (101)
For (98)—(101) to hold, one must ensure that whatever q••1 (θ) and q
••
1 (θ) might be, provided they
remain smaller than ab , the date 1 efforts stay positive, and that e
••
1 (θ, θ) ≥ ∆θ and e••1 (θ, θ) ≥ ∆θ,
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so that we are justified in using the quadratic specification of ψ when writing down the informational
rents Φ(q••1 (θ), q••2 (θ, θ)) and Φ(q••1 (θ), q••2 (θ, θ)), see (31). It is easy to check that a sufficient condition
for this to be true is that (74) holds and thath
(1− δ)a
b
− θ
i
βb >
∙
λνc
(1− ν)2 + βb+ c(1 + λ)
¸
∆θ, (102)
which, given (74), typically holds if ∆θ is close enough to zero. To show that pooling over date 1
quality can occur, let us evaluate the multiplier ξ1 of (49) using (96). This yields
ξ1 = −c∆θν(1− ν)ϕδ(β), (103)
where
ϕδ(β) = 1 + λ+
λν
1− ν
∙
βδc(1 + λ)
βb+ c(1 + λ)
+ 1− βδ .¸ (104)
For each δ > 0, the function ϕδ is strictly decreasing, with ϕδ(0) > 0 and limβ→∞ ϕδ(β) = −∞.
Let β(δ) = ϕ−1δ (0). Clearly β(δ) > 1 and limδ→1 β(δ) < ∞. Thus ξ1 > 0 if β > β(δ). For the
corresponding allocation to be economically meaningful, q••1 (θ) = q••1 (θ) = q
p
1 must remain smaller
than ab . For q0, θ and ∆θ close enough to zero, it is easy to check this will be the case if β < β(δ),
where β(δ) is the positive solution to (56). From (56), one has
ϕδ(β(δ)) = 1 + λ+
λν
1− ν
∙
c(1 + λ)
β(δ)(1− δ)b
+ 1− β(δ)δ ,¸ (105)
as well as limδ→1 β(δ) = ∞ and limδ→1 β(δ)(1 − δ) = 1. Thus (105) implies that limδ→1 ϕδ(β(δ)) =
−∞. Moreover, β(δ) > β(δ) whenever δ is close enough to one. Thus, pooling over date 1 quality
can occur if β ∈ [β(δ),β(δ)).17 To check that this can indeed be the case, one needs only to find
parameter restrictions such that U••0 (θ) > 0, so that (50) is slack as postulated. From (31), (45), and
(100)—(101), one has
U••0 (θ) = c∆θ
µ
qp1 − δq0 −
θ + θ
2
¶
− (c∆θ)2 λν
2β
(1− ν)2[βb+ c(1 + λ)] ,
which is strictly positive for q0, θ and ∆θ close enough to zero. Since ϕδ is independent from q0, θ
and ∆θ, the result follows. ¥
Proof of Proposition 10. For each t = 1, 2, let q∗∗t and q
∗∗
t
be the functions mapping date t− 1 quality
into date t quality following respectively a high and low quality shock at date t− 1 in the model with
a sequence of agents. For any q1 ≥ 0, it is easy to check that
βS0(q∗∗2 (q1)) = (1 + λ)ψ
0(q∗∗2 (q1)− δq1 − θ), (106)
βS0(q∗∗
2
(q1)) = (1 + λ)ψ0(q∗∗2 (q1)− δq1 − θ) +
λν
1− ν Φ2(q1, q
∗∗
2
(q1)), (107)
in analogy with (21)—(22). By (52)—(53) and (106), q••2 (θ, θ) = q
∗∗
2 (q
••
1 (θ)) and q
••
2 (θ, θ) = q
∗∗
2 (q
••
1 (θ)).
Since it is assumed that the regular case obtains in the optimal long-term contract with a single agent,
(54) and (88) imply that q••2 (θ, θ) = Q3,2(q••1 (θ)). Similarly, it follows from (55) that q••2 (θ, θ) =
Q6,2(q••1 (θ)), where for each q1 ≥ 0, Q6,2(q1) is implicitly defined by
17Consider by contrast what happens when δ is close to zero. From (56), one has limδ→0 β(δ) = ∞ and
limδ→0 β(δ)δ = 1. It follows from (105) that limδ→0 ϕδ(β(δ)) = 1 + λ. Since ϕδ is decreasing, we obtain that,
for δ close enough to zero, ϕδ(β) > 0 for any β ≤ β(δ), and thus pooling over date 1 quality cannot occur.
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βS0(Q6,2(q1)) = (1 + λ)ψ0(Q6,2(q1)− δq1 − θ) +
λν
(1− ν)2 Φ2(q1,Q6,2(q1)). (108)
We first compare q∗∗1 (q0) and q
••
1 (θ). It is helpful to define two functions Ω
∗∗
and Ω
••
as follows:
Ω
∗∗
(q1) = (1 + λ)ψ0(q1 − δq0 − θ)− νβδ(1 + λ)ψ0(q∗∗2 (q1)− δq1 − θ)
− (1− ν)βδ(1 + λ)ψ0(q∗∗
2
(q1)− δq1 − θ)− λνβδΦ2(q1, q∗∗2 (q1)),
Ω
••
(q1) = (1 + λ)ψ0(q1 − δq0 − θ)− νβδ(1 + λ)ψ0(q∗∗2 (q1)− δq1 − θ)
− (1− ν)βδ(1 + λ)ψ0(Q3,2(q1)− δq1 − θ).
Both Ω
∗∗
and Ω
••
are increasing, and the difference Ω
∗∗
(q1)− Ω
••
(q1) is proportional to
(1 + λ)ψ0(Q3,2(q1)− δq1 − θ)− (1 + λ)ψ0(q∗∗2 (q1)− δq1 − θ)−
λν
1− ν Φ2(q1, q
∗∗
2
(q1)),
which is negative from the first-order conditions (88) and (107) that define Q3,2(q1) and q∗∗2 (q1) for a
given value of q1. Now, from the Envelope Theorem, it is easy to check that
βS0(q∗∗1 (q0)) = Ω
∗∗
(q∗∗1 (q0)), (109)
βS0(q••1 (θ)) = Ω
••
(q••1 (θ)). (110)
Since S is strictly concave and Ω
∗∗
and Ω
••
are increasing, it follows that q∗∗1 (q0) > q
••
1 (θ), as claimed.
We next compare q∗∗
1
(q0) and q
••
1 (θ). It is helpful to define two functions Ω
∗∗ and Ω•• as follows:
Ω∗∗(q1) = (1 + λ)ψ0(q1 − δq0 − θ)− νβδ(1 + λ)ψ0(q∗∗2 (q1)− δq1 − θ)
− (1− ν)βδ(1 + λ)ψ0(q∗∗
2
(q1(q1)− δq1 − θ)− λνβδΦ2(q1, q∗∗2 (q1(q1)) +
λν
1− ν Φ2(q0, q1),
Ω••(q1) = (1 + λ)ψ0(q1 − δq0 − θ)− νβδ(1 + λ)ψ0(q∗∗2 (q1)− δq1 − θ)
− (1− ν)βδ(1 + λ)ψ0(Q6,2(q1)− δq1 − θ) +
λν
1− ν Φ2(q0, q1) +
λνβ
1− ν Φ1(q1,Q6,2(q1)).
Both Ω∗∗ and Ω•• are increasing, and the difference Ω∗∗(q1)− Ω••(q1) is proportional to
(1 + λ)ψ0(Q6,2(q1)− δq1 − θ) +
λν
(1− ν)2 Φ2(q1,Q6,2(q1))
− (1 + λ)ψ0(q∗∗
2
(q1)− δq1 − θ)−
λν
1− ν Φ2(q1, q
∗∗
2
(q1)),
which is positive from the first-order conditions (107) and (108) that define q∗∗
2
(q1) and Q6,2(q1) for
a given value of q1. Now, from the Envelope Theorem, it is easy to check that
βS0(q∗∗
1
(q0)) = Ω∗∗(q∗∗1 (q0)), (111)
βS0(q••1 (θ)) = Ω
••(q••1 (θ)). (112)
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Since S is strictly concave and Ω∗∗ and Ω•• are increasing, it follows that q••1 (θ) > q∗∗1 (q0), as claimed.
The result follows. ¥
Proof of Proposition 11. Denote by V ∗∗(q0) the ex-ante social welfare obtained in the optimal contract
with a sequence of agents, given an initial quality level q0. One has
V ∗∗(q0) = S(q0) + E [−(1 + λ)ψ(q∗∗1 (q0)− δq0 − θ0) + βS(q∗∗1 (q0))
− (1 + λ)βψ(q∗∗2 (q∗∗1 (q0))− δq∗∗1 (q0)− θ1) + β2S(q∗∗2 (q∗∗1 (q0)))]
−λνΦ(q0, q∗∗1 (q0))− λν
2βΦ(q∗∗1 (q0), q
∗∗
2
(q∗∗1 (q0)))
−λν(1− ν)βΦ(q∗∗
1
(q0), q
∗∗
2
(q∗∗
1
(q0))),
with obvious notation for the terms inside the expectation. Similarly, denote by V ••(q0) the ex-ante
social welfare obtained in the optimal contract with a single agent, given an initial quality level q0.
One has
V ••(q0) = S(q0) + E [−(1 + λ)ψ(q••1 (θ0)− δq0 − θ0) + βS(q••1 (θ0))
− (1 + λ)βψ(q••2 (θ0, θ1)− δq••1 (θ0)− θ1) + β2S(q••2 (θ0, θ1))]
−λνΦ(q0, q••1 (θ))− λνβΦ(q••1 (θ), q••2 (θ, θ)).
To compare V ∗∗(q0) and V
••(q0) in the linear-quadratic case, we need to compute the quality levels
obtained in each regulatory environment. It follows from (106)—(107) that
q∗∗2 (q1) =
βa+ c(1 + λ)(θ + δq1)
βb+ c(1 + λ)
,
q∗∗
2
(q1) =
βa− λν1−ν c∆θ + c(1 + λ)(θ + δq1)
βb+ c(1 + λ)
,
while the levels of quality q••2 (θ0, θ1) are given by (98)—(101). Let
D = βb+ c(1 + λ) +
β2δ2bc(1 + λ)
βb+ c(1 + λ)
and
N = βa+ c(1 + λ)δq0 +
β2δ(a− bEθ)c(1 + λ)
βb+ c(1 + λ)
From (109)—(112), one can verify that
q∗∗1 (q0) =
1
D
∙
N + c(1 + λ)θ +
λνβ2δb
βb+ c(1 + λ)
c∆θ ,¸
q∗∗
1
(q0) =
1
D
½
N + c(1 + λ)θ +
∙
λνβ2δb
βb+ c(1 + λ)
− λν
1− ν
¸
c∆θ
¾
,
and
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q••1 (θ) =
1
D
£
N + c(1 + λ)θ
¤
,
q••1 (θ) =
1
D
½
N + c(1 + λ)θ +
1
1− ν
∙
λνβ2δb
βb+ c(1 + λ)
− λν
¸
c∆θ
¾
.
It is easy to check that E [q∗∗1 (q0)] = E [q
••
1 (θ0)] and E [q∗∗2 (q∗∗1 (q0))] = E [q••2 (θ0, θ1)]. Tedious algebra
then leads to the following expression:
V ∗∗(q0)− V ••(q0) =
λβ
D
µ
ν
1− ν
¶2∙
c∆θ
βb+ c(1 + λ)
¸2
P (ν), (113)
where P (ν) = A1ν3 +A2ν2 +A3ν +A4 is a third-degree polynomial in ν with coefficients given by
A1 = β2δ2b(1− λ)[βb+ c(1 + λ)],
A2 = βδb[βb+ c(1 + λ)]− 2β2δ2bc(1− λ2) + β3δ2b2
µ
5λ
2
− 2
¶
,
A3 = −
3c2λ(1 + λ)2
2
− βbc(δλ2 + 3λ2 + 3λδ + 3λ+ 2δ)− β2b2
µ
δλ+
3λ
2
+ 2δ
¶
−β2δ2bc
µ
5λ2
2
+
3λ
2
− 1
¶
− β3δ2b2
µ
3λ
2
− 1
¶
,
A4 = βδb(1 + λ)[βb+ c(1 + λ)].
The expression (113) is valid when q0, θ and ∆θ are close enough to zero, as in Proposition 9. Note
that A4 > 0, so that P (0) > 0. Moreover, it is easy to verify that
A1 +A2 +A3 +A4 = −
3λ
2
©
[βb+ c(1 + λ)]2 + β2δ2bc(1 + λ)
ª
< 0,
so that P (1) < 0. When λ < 1, A1 > 0, so that limν→−∞ P (ν) = −∞ and limν→∞ P (ν) =∞. Since
P (0) > 0 and P (1) < 0, it follows that P has exactly one root in (−∞, 0), one in (0, 1) and one in
(1,∞). Denoting by ν∗ the unique root of P in (0, 1), the result follows. ¥
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